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Povzetek
Naslov: Statična analiza izvorne kode v agilnih razvojnih metodologijah
To magistrsko delo raziskuje statično analizo kode za varnostno testira-
nje v praktičnem in agilnem kontekstu. Proučevali smo primer norveškega
podjetja Telenor Digital.
Cilj dela je študija izzivov pri vpeljavi orodij za statično analizo kode,
predvsem z vidika razvojnikov, ki razvijajo programsko opremo po agilni
metodologiji. Poleg tega študija raziskuje tudi orodja za statično analizo
kode ob uporabi kompleta orodij za varnostno testiranje (NIST Juliet Test
Suite). Orodja smo primerjali glede na natančnost in glede na število pra-
vilno klasiﬁciranih pozitivnih primerov (true positive rate), ter število pra-
vilno klasiﬁciranih pozitivnih primerov, pri katerih ni hkrati tudi nepravilno
klasiﬁciran pozitiven primer v neranljivem delu kode (discrimination rate) v
istem testnem primeru.
Na koncu smo v Telenorju izvedli naknadno evalvacijo vpeljanega orodja
za statično analizo, katere rezultati so bolje izpostavili izzive pri vpeljavi
orodij za statično analizo kode za namen varnostne revizije v agilnem razvoju.
Zanimali so nas najpomembnejši dejavniki za vpeljavo določenega orodja in
kakšne kompromise so ekipe pripravljene sprejeti ob uporabi tega orodja. Z
namenom da bi podprli uporabo takih orodij, smo tudi proučili pomembne
metrike za evalvacijo le teh.
Ključne besede
varnost v agilnih metodologij, statična analiza za varnostno testiranje, neod-
visna evalvacija orodij za statično analizo
Abstract
Title: Static source code analysis in agile development methodologies
This study investigates static code analysis for security audit in an in-
dustrial and agile settings. The case study is Telenor Digital, located in
Norway.
The study aims to understand the challenges for implementing a static
code analysis tool from agile developers perspective. The study investigated
static code analysis tools on a benchmark security test suite (NIST Juliet
Test Suite) in order to make an informed decision by comparing the tools on
the basis of their true positive rate and discrimination rate. Lastly, a post-
evaluation of the implemented static analysis tool at Telenor was performed.
The results of this work shed more light on what are the challenges for
implementing a static code analysis tool for security audit in an agile settings.
The ﬁndings also identify the most important factors for adopting a particular
tool, the trade-oﬀs the teams are willing to make to adopt this kind of tool
and the relevant metrics for tools evaluation in order to support adoption of
such tools.
Keywords
security in agile methodologies, static analysis for security testing, indepen-
dent evaluation of static analysis tools

Razširjeni povzetek
Agilni način razvoja programske opreme, ki ga spodbuja Manifest o agilno-
sti [1], je danes zelo razširjen med razvojnimi podjetji po celem svetu. Tak
način razvoja se zavzema za razmislek in prilagoditve v rednih kratkih ča-
sovnih intervalih, kar dosežemo s postopnim in ponavljajočim razvojem. V
nasprotju s tradicionalnim razvojem programske opreme, se pri agilnem ra-
zvoju življenski cikli razvoja, od zahtev in načrtovanja do implementacije in
testiranja, ponavljajo v vsaki iteraciji razvoja. Tak pristop skrajša čas ra-
zvoja programske opreme, kar prinaša hitrejšo izdajo produktov na trg kot
kadarkoli doslej.
Zaradi visoke konkurence se prodajalci programske opreme trudijo svojim
strankam ponuditi boljše, stabilnejše in varnejše izdelke. Največji izziv pri
agilnem razvoju, s katerim se podjetja soočajo, je pospešena hitrost razvoja,
ki ovira zmožnost zagotovitve vseh potrebnih korakov v razvoju. Način, s
katerim lahko izboljšamo kvaliteto, stabilnost in varnost produkta v agilnem
načinu razvoja programske opreme, je integracija orodij za statično analizo
v proces razvoja.
I Uvod in opis problema
Nekateri za agilno metodologijo trdijo, da je neskladna z varnostjo [2, 3], saj
je tradicionalni proces varnostnega inženiringa zelo kompleksen in zahteva
veliko dokumentacije, katere pa agilen pristop ne spodbuja. Obstajajo pa
poskusi dodajanja varnostnih aspektov v agilen proces, ki se osredotočajo
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na vpeljavo minimalnih varnostnih aktivnosti v vsako fazo razvoja. Tak
primer je Microsoft SDL [4]. V fazi implementacije je uporaba orodij za
statično analizo kode priljubljena [5], vendar pa lahko ta dodatna aktivnost
povzroči motnje v razvojnikovem delovnem ritmu. Orodja za statično analizo
lahko javljajo tudi lažne pozitivne primere, za katere pa je znano, da znatno
povečajo razvojnikovo obremenitev.
II Obseg naloge
To magistrsko delo raziskuje statično analizo kode za varnostno testiranje v
praktičnem in agilnem kontekstu. Proučevali smo primer norveškega podjetja
Telenor Digital.
Cilj dela je študija izzivov pri vpeljavi orodij za statično analizo kode,
predvsem z vidika razvojnikov, ki razvijajo programsko opremo po agilni
metodologiji. Poleg tega študija raziskuje tudi orodja za statično analizo
kode ob uporabi kompleta orodij za varnostno testiranje (NIST Juliet Test
Suite). Orodja smo primerjali glede na natančnost in glede na število pra-
vilno klasiﬁciranih pozitivnih primerov (true positive rate), ter število pra-
vilno klasiﬁciranih pozitivnih primerov, pri katerih ni hkrati tudi nepravilno
klasiﬁciran pozitiven primer v neranljivem delu kode (discrimination rate) v
istem testnem primeru.
Na koncu smo v Telenorju izvedli naknadno evalvacijo vpeljanega orodja
za statično analizo, katere rezultati so bolje izpostavili izzive pri vpeljavi
orodij za statično analizo kode za namen varnostne revizije v agilnem razvoju.
Zanimali so nas najpomembnejši dejavniki za vpeljavo določenega orodja in
kakšne kompromise so ekipe pripravljene sprejeti ob uporabi tega orodja. Z
namenom da bi podprli uporabo takih orodij, smo tudi proučili pomembne
metrike za evalvacijo le teh.
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III Metodologija
V magistrskem delu smo uporabili kombinacijo različnih kvalitativnih in
kvantitativnih raziskovalnih metod. Kvalitativno zbiranje podatkov smo upo-
rabili za boljše razumevanje konteksta, v katerem naj bi orodje uporabili. Za
pridobivanje kvalitativnih podatkov smo prek spleta izvedli vrsto intervju-
jev s posameznimi člani razvojne skupine. Kvantitativni pristop za zbiranje
statističnih podatkov smo uporabili pri polavtomatski evalvaciji zmogljivosti
orodij. Po vpeljavi izbranega orodja smo izvedli tudi anketo.
IV Sorodna dela
Ideja o uporabi statične analize kot del razvojnega procesa se je pojavila
že pred več kot desetletjem. O tej ideji prvi razpravlja članek Chessa in
McGrawa [6]. Predlagata avtomatizirano analizo varnosti izvorne kode z
uporabo orodij za statično analizo. Članek proučuje pristope statične ana-
lize in orodij, ki so bila v tistem času primerna za tako delo. Beznosov [3]
raziskuje področje klasiﬁkacije metod in tehnik za zagotavljanje varnosti,
pri čemer statično analizo uvršča v skupino metod za zagotavljanje varnosti,
ki jih je mogoče delno avtomatizirati. Ugotavlja, da jih je mogoče upo-
rabiti pri vsaki iteraciji agilnega razvoja brez dodatne denarne ali časovne
obremenitve. Aggarwal [7] predlaga komplementarno integracijo statičnih in
dinamičnih orodij za analizo ter izvaja meritve v nadzorovanem eksperimen-
talnem okolju. Članek se osredotoča samo na eno ranljivost, to je odkrivanje
prekoračitve medpomnilnika (buﬀer overﬂow). Pristop bi lahko izboljšali z
upoštevanjem širšega nabora ranljivosti.
S povečanjem zanimanja za računalniško varnost se je v zadnjih letih
pojavilo tudi več raziskav na to temo. AlBreiki [8] je predstavil ogrodje
za evalvacijo orodij za varnostno analizo, kot so orodja za analizo izvorne
kode, in ocenil nekaj odprtokodnih orodij za statično analizo. Raschke [9] je
nadgradil evalvacijski pristop z vpeljavo modela, ki se osredotoča na analizo
iv
inkrementalnih sprememb v programski kodi. Smith [10] je uporabil nekoliko
drugačen pristop. Osredotočil se je na iskanje informacij, ki bi razvojnikom
olajšale iskanje in odpravo programskih napak, zaznanih s pomočjo statične
analize.
Glavna slabost prej omenjenih pristopov je očitno pomanjkanje empirič-
nih dokazov iz podjetij, kar je poglavitna točka zanimanja v pristopu, ki
ga predlagamo. Osnova za našo idejo je do neke mere izražena v članku
Bace, v študiji primera, ki ocenjuje skupen življenjski cikel uporabe orodij za
varnostno analizo glede na zmožnost odkrivanja ranljivosti, strategije za na-
mestitev in uporabo orodij za varnostno analizo za identiﬁkacijo ter odpravo
ranljivosti. Članek prav tako navaja, da je »pristop, kjer je orodje integrirano
kot del razvojnega procesa kot obvezni del, najboljša strategija prevzema, ki
pa je učinkovita le, če so razvojniki ustrezno usposobljeni za uporabo orodja,
kar jim omogoča odpravo identiﬁciranih ranljivosti v čim krajšem času po
njihovem odkritju«.
V naši študiji smo raziskovali vpeljavo orodij za varnostno analizo na
praktičnem primeru ter ponudili empirične dokaze glede izzivov in metrik za
vpeljavo takšnih orodij.
V Struktura naloge
V drugem poglavju (2) predstavimo pregled ozadja koncepta metodologije
agilnega razvoja, izvor ideje in njene cilje, ter osnovna načela in prakse, ki
opredeljujejo pristop agilnega razvoja. Nato opišemo dva primera takšnih
metodologij: Scrum in Kanban. Poglavje sklenemo s pregledom koncepta
varnosti pri pristopu agilnega razvoja programske opreme.
V tretjem poglavju (3) predstavimo koncept statične analize izvorne kode
in splošne zmogljivosti orodij za statično analizo. Poglavje poudarja ko-
risti uporabe orodij za statično analizo za detekcijo varnostno občutljivih
programskih napak in predlaga ustrezno točko integracije v agilni proces ra-
zvoja. Da bi lahko naslovili prej omenjene pomanjkljivosti sorodnih raziskav,
vsmo skušali razumeti varnostne izzive v okolju agilnega razvoja programske
opreme, identiﬁcirati omejitve orodij za statično analizo in ustrezne metrike
uspešnosti vpeljave orodja za statično analizo v razvojnem okolju.
V četrtem poglavju (4) opišemo študijo primera, izvedeno v treh ločenih
fazah: v fazi pred implementacijo (razdelek 4.2), v fazi neodvisne evalvacije
orodij za statično analizo (razdelek 4.3), in v fazi po implementaciji (razdelek
4.4).
V petem poglavju (5) razpravljamo o ugotovitvah in prispevkih naloge
ter o pomanjkljivostih pristopa in predlagamo ideje za izboljšave v nadaljnjih
raziskavah.
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Chapter 1
Introduction and problem
formulation
The agile approach to software development, promoted by the Agile Mani-
festo [1], is a very widely established practice across companies worldwide.
The approach advocates reﬂection and adjustments at regular short inter-
vals which is accomplished by incremental and iterative development. In
similar fashion, the regular software development life cycle (SDLC) practices
covering the development phases from the requirements and design to the
implementation and testing of a product, are also revisited during each iter-
ation. In return, the approach shortens the time to market, making the race
to product delivery move at a faster pace than ever before.
In this competitive scene, software vendors strive to oﬀer better, more
stable and secure products to their customers. The challenge that they are
facing is the accelerating pace of development which hinders their ability
to cover all the necessary steps in the development. One way of improving
the quality, stability and security of a product in an agile development en-
vironment is to integrate additional static analysis tools in the deployment
pipeline.
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1.1 Problem statement
Agile methodology is argued to be incompatible with security [2, 3] since
traditional security engineering process is very heavy and requires lot of doc-
umentation. There are attempts to develop agile compatible software security
process. These attempts focus on introducing minimal software security ac-
tivities at each development phase. For example, the Microsoft SDL [4]. At
the implementation phase, using a static code analysis tool is shown to be
popular [5]. Nevertheless, this additional activity may cause disturbances in
a developer’s regular ﬂow. In addition, static analysis tool suﬀers from false
positives which are known to signiﬁcantly increase the developer’s burden
and eﬀort.
1.2 Scope of the thesis
This study investigates static code analysis for security audit in an industrial
and agile settings. The case study is Telenor Digital, located in Norway.
The study aims to understand the challenges for implementing a static
code analysis tool from agile developers perspective. The study investigated
static code analysis tools on a benchmark security test suite (NIST Juliet
Test Suite) in order to make an informed decision by comparing the tools on
the basis of their true positive rate and discrimination rate. Lastly, a post-
evaluation of the implemented static analysis tool at Telenor was performed.
The results of this work shed more light on what are the challenges for
implementing a static code analysis tool for security audit in an agile settings.
The ﬁndings also identify the most important factors for adopting a particular
tool, the trade-oﬀs the teams are willing to make to adopt this kind of tool
and the relevant metrics for tools evaluation in order to support adoption of
such tools.
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1.3 Methodology
A combination of various qualitative and quantitative research methods was
used in the case study. Qualitative (exploratory) data collection was used to
form a deeper understanding of the context which the tool had to be applied
to. A round of individual interviews with the team members was conducted
online. Furthermore, a quantitative approach was used to collect statistical
data via a semi-automated evaluation of tools’ capabilities. Lastly, a survey
was performed after the chosen tool was implemented.
1.4 Related work
The idea of applying static analysis as part of the development process was
introduced more than a decade ago and Chess and McGraw’s paper [6] ap-
pears to be the ﬁrst to discuss this idea. They propose automating source-
code security analysis with static analysis tools. The publication provides
an overview on static analysis approaches and tools that were at the time
suitable for the purpose. Beznosov [3] works on classifying security assurance
methods and techniques and places static analysis in the group of security
assurance methods that can be semi-automated, explaining that they can be
applied during each iteration without signiﬁcantly burdening the budget or
causing time overheads in agile projects. Aggarwal [7] suggests a comple-
mentary integration of both, static and dynamic analysis tools and performs
measurements under a controlled experimental setting. The paper focuses
only on one vulnerability, that is the detection of buﬀer overﬂow. Hereby, the
approach may be improved by considering a wider range of vulnerabilities.
As interest in security signiﬁcantly increases in recent years, research
on this topic has also intensiﬁed. AlBreiki [8] introduces a framework for
evaluating security analysis tools (SATs) such as source code analyzers, and
evaluates a few open source static analysis tools. Raschke [9] upgrades the
evaluation approach, by introducing a model that focuses on reviewing only
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the increment of the software. Nevertheless, a somewhat diﬀerent perspective
on the matter is taken by Smith [10], focusing on identifying developers’
information needs in order for them to be able to ﬁnd and ﬁx faults in the
code, detected by means of static analysis.
The main downside in the aforementioned approaches is evidently, the
lack of empirical evidence from companies, which is the main point of interest
in the approach we are proposing. The basis for our idea is to some extent
reﬂected in Baca’s paper [11], a case study that evaluates the overall life cycle
of an SAT usage, considering ability to detect vulnerabilities, strategies for
deployment, and usage of SAT to identify and correct vulnerabilities. The
paper also states that "a conﬁguration management approach where the tool
is integrated as part of the development process as a mandatory part is the
best adoption strategy that is only eﬃcient if developers are educated in
order to make use of the tool to correct identiﬁed vulnerabilities as soon as
possible after detection".
Nevertheless, the approach used in this study is to investigate the im-
plementation of SAT in industrial setting and provide empirical evidence
regarding challenges and metrics for adopting a SAT.
1.5 Thesis layout
First, in chapter 2, we give a background overview on the concept of agile
development methodologies, the origin of the idea and its objectives, as well
as the founding principles and practices deﬁning the agile development ap-
proach. We further describe two examples of such methodologies: Scrum
and Kanban. The chapter is concluded with an overview of the concept of
security in the agile software development approach.
Chapter 3 discusses the concept of static source code analysis and the
general capabilities of static analysis tools. It emphasizes the beneﬁts of
using static analysis tools as security fault detectors and suggests a point of
integration in the agile deployment pipeline.
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Further, in order to address the aforementioned shortcomings of the re-
lated research work so far, we tried to understand the security challenges in
an agile software development environment, identify the limitations of static
analysis tools and relevant metrics for adopting a static analysis tool in an
industry setting. Chapter 4 describes the case study that was conducted
in three separate phases: pre-implementation phase (section 4.2), indepen-
dent evaluation of static analysis tools (section 4.3) and post-implementation
evaluation (section 4.4).
Finally, chapter 5 discusses the ﬁndings and contributions of the thesis, as
well as the shortcomings of the approach and proposes ideas on improvements
for further research.
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Chapter 2
Agile development
methodologies
The agile software development approach has evolved as a direct consequence
to the ever increasing needs for shortening a product’s time-to-deliver. Cus-
tomers expect to get ready-to-assess product functionalities in the early stage
of a product development in order to be able to amend the initial require-
ments and adapt them in a way to achieve technical feasibility. Therefore,
rapidly changing software requirements are driving the market dynamics into
a state where variations of a product must be delivered often, in short time
intervals, i.e. iterations. In response to this market dynamics the basic idea
of the agile software development approach was born.
The agile software development approach superseded the traditional, "plan-
driven" software development approach. The development process in the
traditional approach is sequentially executed in ﬁve consecutive development
phases: architecture, design, coding/debugging (implementation), quality
assurance (veriﬁcation) and release management [12]. In contrast to this ap-
proach, the agile approach propagates a development methodology where all
of the development phases are intertwined, can be executed in parallel and
are revised at each iteration. These practices yield the beneﬁts of develop-
ing software iteratively and delivering increments of a product in the early
7
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stages of development, instead of delivering a product as a whole in the ﬁnal
development stages.
Precisely its iterative nature is the greatest advantage of the agile de-
velopment approach. This opportunistic development approach provides a
possibility for customers to give early feedback and make sure that the de-
velopment of the product itself moves in the right direction. It enables early
detection of gaps between business expectations and developers understand-
ing, discovery of customer needs, rather than customer wishes and early
discovery of technical barriers [2]. Providing feedback which may lead to
reﬁnement of the initial requirements and speciﬁcations is crucial to the eﬃ-
ciency and productivity of the product development, as well as to the quality
of the product itself.
The formal establishment of the main principles of agile methodologies
roots back to February 2001, when a group of consultants met in Utah to
share their experiences, practices and needs [13]. Based on their common
opinions, they instituted a manifesto, "The Manifesto for Agile Software De-
velopment", to summarize the four important elements to value:
Individuals and interactions over processes and tools
Working software over comprehensive documentation
Customer collaboration over contract negotiation
Responding to change over following a plan
By imposing these directions to the developers community, the Agile Al-
liance set the foundations to a whole new software development mindset.
Nevertheless, they do not disqualify the values on the right, they just pri-
oritize the values on the left. These four basic elements have been widely
accepted and valued ever since the establishment of the manifesto.
• Individuals and interactions over process and tools: The human
factor is appreciated as the most inﬂuential factor in a project develop-
ment to aﬀect the quality of the product and success of development.
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Formalization of processes is considered inﬂexible and therefore un-
suited for an agile approach.
• Working software over comprehensive documentation: Piles of
documentation did not provide any particular added value to customers
and the focus is now reoriented to completed and working portions/-
functionalities of a software in order to be able to provide frequent
feedback. The amount of documentation produced is determined by
the customers’ own requirements.
• Customer collaboration over contract negotiation: Negotiating
over a product’s functionalitites, technical feasibility and overall cus-
tomers requirements is now done at each iteration and is a part of
the development cycle itself. This means that the contract no longer
contains detailed requirements speciﬁcations, but the same purpose is
accomplished through customer collaboration.
• Responding to change over following a plan: In contrast to the
traditional development approach where a ﬁnal plan is established at
the early stages of a project initialization, the agile approach propagates
progressively deﬁning smaller goals, i.e. a goal per iteration. This
enables progressive growth of the product, as the initial requirements
are iteratively revised and amended.
2.1 Principles
The establishment of the manifesto was followed by the creation of the "Prin-
ciples Behind the Agile Manifesto". It is consisted of 12 principles which
present general truths that support the manifesto and serve as guidelines to
the teams that implement the agile methodology:
1. Our highest priority is to satisfy the customer through early and con-
tinuous delivery of valuable software.
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2. Welcome changing requirements, even late in development.
3. Deliver working software frequently, from a couple of weeks to a couple
of months, with a preference to the shorter time scale.
4. Business people and developers must work together daily through the
project.
5. Build projects around motivated individuals.
6. The most eﬃcient and eﬀective method of conveying information to
and within a development team is face-to-face conversation.
7. Working software is the primary measure of progress.
8. Agile processes promote sustainable development.
9. Continuous attention to technical excellence and good design enhances
agility.
10. Simplicity—the art of maximizing the amount of work not done—is
essential.
11. The best architectures, requirements, and designs emerge from self-
organizing teams.
12. At regular intervals, the team reﬂects on how to become more eﬀective,
then tunes and adjusts its behavior accordingly.
2.2 Practices
There are a number of activities that support the principles of the agile soft-
ware development approach. These speciﬁc activities denote the application
of the basic features oﬀered by the agile development approach to a real
project setting and are also known as the agile development practices. A
team that intends to adopt the agile software development approach, must
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consider implementing the set of practices that best ﬁt its preferences and
goals, as well as the nature of the project itself.
In continuation, we provide a more detailed description of the basic prac-
tices that portray an agile software development life cycle. In accordance
with the main focus of this research work, we are particularly interested in
the iterative and continuous nature of the agile software development ap-
proach along with the practices that deﬁne it, as well as the inﬁltration of
the testing practices in a SDLC as deﬁned by the agile software development
approach.
• Short Iterations
An iteration is a constant limited time interval, during which all of
the development phases are covered. At the beginning of each iteration
a narrowed scope of functionalities is deﬁned which are covered by a
set of user stories that describe the ﬁnal goal of the iteration. The
requirements and design are then revised in order to meet the new
goal and are followed by implementation of the user stories. These
activities lead to an iteration release which denotes the conclusion of an
iteration. The product of an iteration is a subset of the general product
and integrates in the ﬁnal system, which evolves with each increment.
The scope of an iteration is reduced to ﬁt a regular predetermined
timeframe. The usual length of an iteration is one-four weeks, but
should be determined in an optimal way to suit the regular team’s
work organization and practices.
Nonetheless, this particular agile development practice is what diﬀer-
entiates the agile approach from its predecessors in that, it enables
customers to change their requirements even later in the process of
product development.
• Short Releases/Sprints
Customers are always kept in the loop with what is being developed,
that is the features under development and the state of current develop-
12 CHAPTER 2. AGILE DEVELOPMENT METHODOLOGIES
ment. The customers get acquainted with the features that have been
developed by frequent releases of the software, which enables them to
test the software and provide feedback in the early stages of the prod-
uct development. An increment of the software is usually released at
the end of each sprint, which is consisted of a predetermined number
of iterations. At the end of each iteration, the technical progress and
challenges are discussed and on the basis of the customers’ business
experience and resources, they are allowed to change their business or
development requirements and manoeuvre with the evolution of the
product in the most favourable direction.
• Code and Test
As working software has been advocated as one of the four founding
elements of the agile software development approach by the "Manifesto
for Agile Software Development", much attention is put precisely on
the quality of the software. In order to be able to ensure better qual-
ity of the software they are developing, developers are now expected
to include unit, acceptance and integration testing in the development
process. This enforcement is intended to replace the need for documen-
tation which gets outdated with time. This way, the testing can also
be automated and the testing practices are part of the responsibilities
of the development team. Automated testing ensures that the software
being developed is always working properly and all changes made are
backward compatible.
• Continuous Integration
The automated testing is usually a part of the continuous integration
practice, which is also a very valuable agile development practice. Usu-
ally, each developer develops on a local machine and pushes the code
to a common develop branch at least once a day. After integrating the
software, an automated build is performed which also runs the tests. If
a test fails, the build will fail consequently and this will alert developers
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to ﬁx the bugs that have caused the failure.
• Done Criteria
A successful integration build however, is not enough to ensure that a
software is ready to be released. Sometimes, a team deﬁnes a list of
conditions that need to be completed, before an iteration is considered
to be "done". This criteria may vary from team to team and is deter-
mined by the team itself based on its own preferences. When all of the
requirements speciﬁed in the "done criteria" are completed, then the
software is ready to be released and delivered to the customer.
2.3 Examples of agile software development
methodologies
Since the establishment of the Agile Principles, a number of agile software
development methodologies have been been conceived. The methodologies
emerge from the basic set of principles and practices, but propose a unique ap-
proach in embedding these practices into the regular development processes.
The uniqueness of the approach is dictated by the priorities, preferences and
perceptions of what a software development method should look like [14].
The following are amongst the most popular agile methodologies: Extreme
Programming (XP), Scrum, Rational Uniﬁed Process (RUP), Lean Devel-
opment (LD), Kanban, Agile Modeling, Feature-Driven Development (FDD)
etc. Further, we will focus on presenting two of the aforementioned agile
development approaches in greater detail.
• Scrum
Scrum teams are expected to be an independent group of individuals
who would be capable of functioning in a team where the organizational
responsibilities are in complete control of the group itself. The team
strives to achieve a common goal, which is deﬁned by iteration. The
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way in which the common goal will be achieved is completely entrusted
to the skills of the team members.
As described in [15], Scrum is an iterative agile practice which supports
incremental delivery of software. In the initial phase of the project, an
architect designs the founding architecture of the system and deﬁnes
the project’s vision which is to be consistent throughout all the devel-
opment phases. Developers must be able to make amendments to the
initial architecture as requirements change during the project, which
will be under the supervision and control of the leading architect. The
requirements and architecture design are revised at each iteration, when
developers specify a goal for a particular iteration and identify a set of
tasks that will contribute to its achievement. Each developer is assigned
a list of tasks that is feasible to complete during the iteration. The list
of tasks that should be completed is called backlog and it is also re-
vised at each iteration, as priorities and status of tasks changes. At the
end of each sprint, which may be consisted of a number of iterations,
potentially shippable software should be delivered to the customer.
• Kanban
The founding idea of the Kanban (eng. signboard) approach originates
as early as in 1950s, when it was introduced as a manufacturing schedul-
ing system [16]. This control ﬂow mechanism advocates the principle
of triggering processing activities by process demand signals.
Fifty years later, the same Kanban mindset was applied to software
development. The idea was implemented by David J. Anderson, who
was helping a team in Microsoft to improve its productivity. A key
characteristic of the Kanban approach is the focus on prioritized fea-
tures/functionalities at a given time, increasing productivity as devel-
opers focus only on particular set of tasks. This leads to limiting the
work in progress and constantly releasing new working features. An-
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other important characteristic of the approach is that it motivates team
members to visualise the workﬂow and measure the cycle time. This
provides greater transparency and motivates developers to constantly
improve.
The Kanban approach is founded on the following principles [16]:
– Visualise the workﬂow
– Limit Work In Progress
– Measure and manage ﬂow
– Make process policies explicit
– Improve collaboratively (using models and the scientiﬁc method)
2.4 Secure agile development
As elaborated earlier, the regular development ﬂow in the traditional soft-
ware development approaches spreads through the separate phases: archi-
tecture, design, implementation, quality assurance and release management.
The phases in the regular SDLC are executed consecutively and security
practices are embedded in each phase [12]. At ﬁrst, security functional
requirements, abuse stories and misuse cases are created during the
requirements phase. Further, threat modeling is performed in the design
phase in order to determine the possible threats. During the development
phase, testing practices are performed, such as static analysis and re-
gression testing and spread through the quality assurance phase where
dynamic testing is performed. Lastly, ﬁrewall policies and patches to
the deployment environment are performed during the release management
phase as the concluding phase in the development cycle.
Nevertheless, we already know the agile software development practices
good enough to be able to notice that the traditional security practices would
not ﬁt the agile deployment pipeline. According to [3], there are four conﬂict-
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ing points at which traditional security practices confront the agile software
development approach:
1. Tacit Knowledge/Documentation: A common practice in tradi-
tional security assurance is that developers and security evaluators are
usually separated in order to stay independent and focused on their
own work, as well as to be as objective as possible. Consequently, the
practice induces the need for extensive documentation as a reimburse-
ment for the knowledge not gained due to the dislocation. When it
comes to the agile approach, the practice contradicts to the ﬁrst of
the four basic elements that the agile approach values. By prioritizing
individuals and interactions over processes and tools, the approach ad-
vocates closer relations among coworkers, constraining the feasibility
of the separation practice.
2. Lifecycle: The iterative repetition of the SDLC phases in the ag-
ile software development approach in contrast to the sequential SDLC
phases in the traditional software development approach, aﬀect the
way the traditional security assurance practices are executed. Instead
of performing a particular practice once at the end of a phase (threat
modelling, regression testing, static analysis, dynamic analysis and ﬁre-
wall policies), the agile approach imposes the need of executing these
practices iteratively. Consequently, this entails a need for automation
in order to optimize the execution of repetitive security assurance prac-
tices.
3. Refactoring: The ability to respond to changing requirements is also
one of the key agile development elements. When new functionalities
are created it may happen that they oppose to the security constraints
that are already in place. These constraints are set during the initial
design phase, meaning that the agile approach again imposes the need
of revisiting and amending these constraints at each iteration.
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4. Testing: The focus of testing in the traditional software development
approach is broad and covers the whole system. It is executed only once
per SDLC and it is usually performed by a third party. In contrast to
this, the agile software development approach entails a need to narrow
the focus of testing down to the functionality level and implement it as
an integral part of an iteration.
From the above discussions, it can be concluded that the crucial require-
ment imposed by the agile software development approach is to integrate
the security assurance practices in the agile deployment pipeline and there-
fore, shift the responsibility to developers themselves. The code artifact goes
through many sequence events during development, until deployment and
delivery to the customer. It is processed by several tools which are integral
components of almost every deployment pipeline and should be considered
as potential points of security assurance integration:
• Issue Tracker: During the design phase, initial requirements are set
and features are deﬁned appropriately. The development of features is
then fragmented to smaller tasks which are added to the backlog. Later,
each developer is assigned a subset of tasks pulled out of the pool of
tasks. Moreover, as features are developed and existing requirements
change, additional tasks and bugs should also be recorded somewhere.
It is very convenient to use a project management tool that keeps track
of the issues and their status, which is exactly the basic point of the
issue tracking tools such as Jira. It can provide an overview of the
current project stage and the overall progress and pace of development.
• Integrated Development Environment (IDE): During the next,
implementation phase, the developer starts working on the set of tasks
that has been assigned to him/her by writing the code on his/her local
machine. In order to make this experience more pleasant for the de-
veloper and to stimulate his productiveness, special development tools
were created for that purpose. Such development tools are also known
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as integrated development environments (IDEs) and the following IDEs
are some of the most commonly used: Eclipse, IntelliJ IDEA, NetBeans,
Microsoft Visual Studio etc. In addition to providing an editor for writ-
ing code, IDEs also provide a compiler or an interpreter for the code,
a debugger and other helpful plugins to ease the programming, as part
of the development workspace.
• Version Control System/Source Code Management: Coordi-
nating with a team of developers and developing features on a same
code base is not an easy task. A lot of problems may occur, from si-
multaneously working on a same ﬁle, overwriting another developer’s
code, to mixing up up-to-date code with older version of the code,
or accidentally deleting some code/ﬁles etc., all resulting in code loss.
Hereby, source code management software was developed to help teams
coordinate their work and keep track of the code developed, along with
more detailed information on who created it, who modiﬁed it and when
did the changes occur, identifying points of conﬂict and alerting about
them early enough, before they aﬀect other parts of the code base.
Version control systems or source code management tools such as Git
and Subversion (SVN) handle checkout, branching, forking and other
actions on the code repositories under their management.
• Build Automation: An agile software development approach requires
automation at any point in the deployment pipeline. Routine actions
performed on the code on daily or even hourly bases such as compiling
the source code, packaging the binary code and running automated
tests on the same code, can and most certainly should be automated.
Thus, build automation tools have been created for the purpose of
compiling, integrating and linking separate components of the code in
the correct order, as deﬁned by developers. Some of the most popular
build automation tools are Ant, Gradle, Maven etc.
• Continuous Integration (CI) Server: While the aforenamed build
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automation tools perform a set of tasks related to building the code
locally, the same actions should also be triggered on the common code
repository. As each developer commits the code which needs to be
merged to the common repository, the code should be continuously
integrated in a way that does not disturb the regular ﬂow of the de-
ployment pipeline. This is done by a continuous integration server,
which detects updates committed to the code repository and automat-
ically invokes compiling, building and testing actions on the updated
code. Examples of such tools are Jenkins, Travis, Bamboo etc.
The potential points of security assurance integration we have identiﬁed,
oﬀer diverse opportunities for incorporating security assurance practices in
the deployment pipeline. For instance, thread modelling may be done on
sprint basis and security related bugs may be entered in the issue tracking
system. Next, static source code analysis (SCA) can be inﬁltrated as part
of a developer’s IDE, a local automated build or a continuous integration
server. Dynamic analysis can also be inﬁltrated in an automated build or
executed by the CI server. Furthermore, build automation and a CI server
oﬀer opportunities for inﬁltrating unit, integration and regression testing as
well.
In conclusion, the agile software development approach oﬀers new and
still inexhausted opportunities for integration of security assurance practices.
To that end, we need to be inventive and innovative in our approaches to
incorporating security as part of an agile deployment pipeline in order not
to waste the unused potential. In that process, it is crucial to keep pushing
the security practices as early in the deployment pipeline as possible, so that
they are always up to date with prevailing requirements, it costs less to ﬁx
them and we learn early not to repeat them.
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Chapter 3
Static source code analysis
Static source code analysis stands for code analysis that does not require an
execution of a program in order to be performed. The initial static analysis
practices consist of simple syntactic checks, performed by a grep or a ﬁnd
command [17]. Latter static analysis tools extended the very basic idea to
capture the most common faults of a particular coding language and im-
plemented it for various programming languages. The main purpose was to
achieve automated source code review and in that way, mitigate the risks of
code instability.
It is recommended that automated source code analysis is implemented as
early in the software development lifecycle as possible in order to detect code
faults in the early stages of development. Hence, when faults are detected
earlier it is much less cumbersome for a developer to ﬁx them while the
number of faults is low. This will also prevent duplicating the faults, as
developers learn the good coding practices in the early stages of the product
development. It is also much less costly for the customer, as resources are
used much more wisely. Moreover, the source code analysis is automated, so
during its execution it does not require any eﬀort from developers. However,
SATs may also report false positives, i.e. faults detected by an SAT scanner
that are either not real faults, or the team unanimously agrees that their
presence is not harmful. Therefore, reports’ review still do require developers’
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assistance.
3.1 Capabilities
The capabilities of a particular static analysis tool may vary signiﬁcantly
across a spectrum of ﬂaws that can be found by source code analysis. This
type of analysis is performed on the source code in its original or compiled
form, without executing the software. The analysis checks for faults based
on a set of predeﬁned rules which represent descriptions of the faults a tool
aims to detect. However, the detection is not always completely precise and
may be at times prone to detecting incorrect faults which may not be critical
to the software execution, which are referred to as false positives.
Nevertheless, the main purpose of static analysis is to check for unsound
code constructs, structural problems, common vulnerabilities and errors of
the language itself, as well as control and data ﬂows in a software. Hereby,
static code analysis may provide better understanding of a system in the
early stages of an SDLC. As further explained in [12], SATs generally scan
for unhandled error conditions, unﬁltered input variables, cross-site scripting,
cross site request forgery, command injection, object availability and scoping,
and potential buﬀer overﬂows. These issues are usually a direct consequence
to programming errors.
Static code analysis may be used as an automated replacement for peer
code review. Depending on the point in the deployment pipeline where static
analysis is performed, developers will get reports on detected faults either in
their development environment or as external reports. Either way, they will
be able to act upon accordingly and learn from the ﬁndings very early in the
SDLC.
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3.2 SAT as a security fault detector
The inception of the idea to detect security vulnerabilities through source
code analysis, as remembered [6], was a very modest variation of syntactic
search for matches in a ﬁle, based on a set of predeﬁned rules, which were
supposed to reﬂect possible security vulnerabilities. According to Baca in
[18], a failure is labeled as security vulnerable if, under any conditions or
circumstances, it results in denial of service, unauthorized disclosure, unau-
thorized destruction of data, or unauthorized modiﬁcation of data, which are
all consequences of an exploit.
OWASP speciﬁes a list of the most common types of security ﬂaws that
are often encountered in web applications, also known as the OWASP Top
10 list [19]:
A1-Injection: An injection occurs when untrusted data circumvents
any input validation and tricks the system into executing malicious code
or queries, which may even give the adversary access to the database,
without authorization. SQL, OS, and LDAP injection are such exam-
ples.
A2-Broken Authentication and Session Management: Often-
times, adversaries take advantage of weak implementation of the au-
thentication and session management in an application and manage to
steal sensitive data such as passwords and session tokes. The stolen
information may be compromised and the identities may be abused.
A3-Cross-Site Scripting (XSS): Weak input validation may also
allow adversaries to inject malicious scripts that trick the browser into
executing them. This way attackers can take over user sessions or
change the application’s normal behaviour.
A4-Insecure Direct Object References: In a lack of appropriate
protection mechanisms and access control, internal references to objects
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such as ﬁles, directories and database key may be exposed to and result
in data leakage when exploited by an attacker.
A5-Security Misconﬁguration: Conﬁguration settings are omnipresent
throughout all layers of application development: application conﬁgu-
ration, servers’ conﬁguration, platform conﬁguration etc. Factory set-
tings must never get to production, as attacker can easily detect and
exploit such weaknesses. Therefore, secure conﬁguration must be prop-
erly deﬁned and always up to data.
A6-Sensitive Data Exposure: During development, a coder must
be very careful about where and how sensitive information is stored
and make sure that it is always validated before reaching the data
access layer. One of the truly naive programming errors made is hard
coding such data, as an adversary may be able to access it by the use of
reverse engineering methods performed on source code binaries. Such
data must be encrypted even when in transit.
A7-Missing Function Level Access Control: Lack of appropriate
access control checks on the function level may enable adversaries to
forge requests and gain access to functionalities bypassing authoriza-
tion. Developers must therefore ensure that access control is properly
handled throughout all parts of the application.
A8-Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF):A users browser is tricked
into sending and HTTP request to a malicious web application, contain-
ing cookie information and other sensitive data about the user stored
in the session, possibly even authentication data.
A9-Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities: Usually,
vulnerabilities of public software, such as third-party libraries and frame-
works are publicly disclosed and attackers may exploit these vulnera-
bilities to attack applications that use such components.
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A10-Unvalidated Redirects and Forwards: As already mentioned,
lack of validation may lead to serious exploits and force the software into
unexpected behaviours. This also holds for validation of redirects and
forwards, as it enables adversaries to redirect users to other malware
pages or gain access to unauthorized pages.
To summarize, static code analysis does have the ability of identifying
security vulnerabilities in source code and it is most eﬀective if introduced
early enough in the software development life cycle. It can provide early in-
formation about potential security issues present in the source code, prioritize
them and suggest ways to ﬁx them. Hence, if developers decide to act ac-
cordingly, they may even prevent the further spreading of the reported issues.
Furthermore, the management and a security team may also be involved in
the process and make decisions based on the static analysis reports.
3.3 SAT - point of integration in the agile
deployment pipeline
Static source code analysis can be implemented either locally on a developer’s
workstation (IDE, build automation tool), or remotely (CI server).
• On-premises: an SAT can be used as IDE plugin or as part of the local
automated build. Prior to committing the code to the code repository,
a developer can run the static analysis in his/her own development en-
vironment and quickly navigate to the source of issue and apply the ﬁx.
There are multiple beneﬁts of running static analysis on-premises: de-
velopers are given the freedom to customize the rules, can decide when
to run the scanner and the code does not have to leave the environment.
• Oﬀ-premises: an SAT can be run as part of a remote automated build.
The automated build is triggered on the code in the code repository
and generated static analysis reports will contain information about
26 CHAPTER 3. STATIC SOURCE CODE ANALYSIS
the overall changes comitted from all of the developers. The beneﬁt of
running static analysis oﬀ-premises is consistency of security rules and
policies across teams.
Depending on their needs and preferences, a team is free to choose one
of the aforenamed options, or a combination. The team also decides about
the frequency of running static analysis. A common practice is to run it as
part of the nightly build and immediately ﬁx only critical issues. The list of
issues should certainly be reviewed over the sprint meetings, where it should
be decided which code changes are too critical to be released and the related
issues should be added to the next sprint.
Chapter 4
Case study
Driven by the urge of the competitive market, developers are oftentimes
required to deliver a product fast, in iterative short time intervals, inevitably
aﬀecting the short term quality of the product. However, a failure in security
at any point of its development life cycle may lead to harmful consequences.
In order to avoid this, security testing may be performed on a more frequent
basis and security ﬂaws may be discovered and addressed as early in the
life cycle as possible, making it easier and less costly for the ﬂaws to be
ﬁxed. Hence, we believe that integrating automated security testing in the
development cycle itself may have the potential to foster greater level of
security of the software developed.
Nevertheless, imposing additional activities may cause disturbances in
the regular ﬂow of the agile SDLC and subsequently, also aﬀect developers’
eﬀectiveness. In order to understand the challenges that may arise as a con-
sequence to implementing automated static code analysis in an agile software
development environment, we have decided to perform a case study in an in-
dustry setting. In addition, the purpose of the case study is to also identify
the limitations of static analysis tools and relevant metrics for adopting static
analysis tool in an organization.
The case study is performed in collaboration with one of the teams in
Telenor’s research and development center, an incubator of modern and pro-
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gressive approaches to digital communication - Telenor Digital. The case
study was conducted on a software telco team, which is working on the im-
plementation of a mobile virtual network operator (MVNO). Their network
operator is built on top of Telenor Norway’s radio network, which is accessed
via an MVNO interface. The product is under development for somewhat
more than two years at the moment of conducting the case study and it has
still not been released for commercial use, but this is planned to happen in
the near future.
It is the team’s ambition to provide stable and secure mobile network
services, that will meet the ever increasing security and privacy requirements
and needs of end users. Being chased by the fast pace of product develop-
ment, it is in developers best interest to detect and correct software faults
as early in the development cycle as possible. Hereby, they will insure lower
development time and fault quantity reduction in the long run. With that
aim in mind, the team is considering to implement automatic static code
analysis during development.
4.1 Methodology
In order to achieve the aforementioned goals of the case study, i.e. to un-
derstand the security challenges in an agile software development environ-
ment, identify the limitations of static analysis tools and relevant metrics
for adopting a static analysis tool, the study was conducted in three sepa-
rate phases: pre-implementation phase, independent evaluation of tools and
post-implementation evaluation. The case study is used to address three
main research questions and a separate research method is used to answer
each of them.
• RQ1: What are the most important factors for adopting a particular
tool?
• RQ2: Identify the SAST tools capabilities in order to support adoption
by teams.
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The pre-implementation phase was executed with the purpose to get an
insight into the team’s practices, regular ﬂow of development and their ex-
pectations. The idea was to examine the context of an industry setting where
the agile software development approach is implemented in practice and iden-
tify the security challenges in that context. In order to get an understanding
of the developers’ personal opinions, practices, wishes and expectations we
have used qualitative research approach and performed individual interviews
with 6/8 developers involved in the product development. The interview
transcriptions can be found in appendix A.
Further, we suggest a set of static analysis tools that have the potential to
yield improvements in the software security level. An independent evaluation
of static analysis tools was performed in the second phase of the case study,
aiming to identify the limitations of static analysis tools and to compare their
performance. To derive these results, we used a quantitative research method
and performed the comparison of the tools by running each of the scanners
against a test suite designed speciﬁcally for comparing the capabilities of
SATs in identifying coding faults which may lead to security vulnerabilities.
Lastly, a tool was chosen and implemented by the team during the third
and last phase of the study conducted. The developer responsible for the
implementation provided us with answers to the post-implementation ques-
tionnaire, which is available in appendix C. The answers helped us evaluate
the team’s satisfaction, future use intention, perceived usefulness and com-
patibility, as well as to identify the subjective norm.
4.2 Pre-implementation phase
As end users push the bounds of software expectations, software vendors often
ﬁnd themselves in competing roles to meet them. In order to understand the
security challenges development teams are faced with, we have conducted a
round of personal interviews with the developers in the team.
30 CHAPTER 4. CASE STUDY
4.2.1 Interview design and questions
The interview is contained of ﬁve sections: professional background, per-
sonal opinion, agile practices, development environment and quality assur-
ance (QA) and security. The ﬁrst two sections were intended for all intervie-
wees (all developers including the tech lead) and the last three sections were
intended for the tech lead only. The data inquired in the last three sections
provides and in-depth description of the context studied.
1. Professional background: The set of questions in this section in-
quire data on the developers professional background, such as job title,
years of programming experience, any security related experiences and
familiarity with security vulnerabilities.
2. Personal opinion (on system and security analysis): This section is
intended to collect data related to the ﬁrst research question, that is
on developers expectations and challenges they fear with regards to
static analysis tools implementation. Developers are asked about their
current practices and their future expectations with regards to the use
of static analysis tools during development. They answer on their fears,
preferences and challenges they foresee with regards to integrating a
static analysis tool in their regular development work ﬂow.
3. Agile practices: The third section of the interview focuses on gath-
ering data about the team’s regular agile development practices. It
collects data on which agile methodology is used, the frequency of soft-
ware releases, developers’ eﬃciency and velocity measurements, burn-
down charts, iteration length and iteration description in terms of the
processes contained, pair programing and re-factoring practices.
4. Development environment: Gathering information on the team’s
development environment was important in making an informed deci-
sion when choosing the appropriate tool for implementation, as well as
on choosing the point of integration in the agile deployment pipeline.
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In this section, we collected information on the OS platforms, IDEs
and programming languages used during development, their continu-
ous integration practices and the existence of a testing, staging and
production environment.
5. Quality assurance (QA) and security: The last set of questions
was intended to gather information on the team’s usual quality assur-
ance and security practices. The questions focus on the testing/security
testing tools in use, checks for security vulnerabilities, software qual-
ity measurement etc. In addition, the questions also inquire data on
the security issues the team is faced with and would like to address,
which is helpful in understanding and identifying the team’s security
concerns.
4.2.2 Context
Most of the information on the team’s general practices were gained in the
interview with the technical lead of the team. It gave us an insight into
the current state of the software telco team, which helped us gain a better
understanding of the context. The interview provides details on their regular
coding and development practices, as well as on the usual work ﬂow of the
team, in general.
Agile practices
We found out that the team uses a combination of the agile methodologies
Scrum and Kanban, which the tech lead referred to as “rainbow” approach to
agile. At ﬁrst, they were not too strict about this kind of team organization,
so they started oﬀ using a Kanban-like methodology. Therefore, they did
not follow any speciﬁc process framework, but they were simply working
on a bunch of tasks and were doing the coordination in between. Now,
they are moving towards more traditional Scrum-like development and they
have created separate small groups of developers which specialize on separate
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functionalities, such as business support system integration, hosting, setup
and infrastructure. Coordination/sprint review is now done every two weeks,
as each iteration/sprint lasts for two weeks. Coordination is done in order to
make sure that they are all moving in the same direction, deﬁne the scope
of the next sprint, i.e. the set of tasks that should be included in the next
iteration and do a time estimation for those tasks.
An iteration in the Telco’s case begins with scoping and deﬁning relevant
tasks for the following sprint. Then the developers work on the tasks and
after a task is completed, a merge-request is done and the code is reviewed
by a peer programmer. When accepted, the code is ﬁt for being merged and
it is pushed to the main branch. The code is then built on the build server
and unit and acceptance tests are run. If a test fails, it will break the build.
This process is continually repeated over each iteration.
In the past year they have invested their time and eﬀort into setting up
an infrastructure that will support a development process with much more
frequent releases. Therefore, at the time of the interview it was diﬃcult to
specify the pace at which software releases were done. However, as most
of the work on the infrastructure is now completed, they predict to release
software every few weeks in the near future.
Despite their prior eﬀorts to set up some metrics in order to measure a
developer’s eﬃciency, such as estimation of stories and measuring focus fac-
tors, the idea of measuring eﬃciency has turned out to be quite diﬃcult to
implement successfully in the team. Therefore, they do not use any tech-
niques for measuring developers eﬃciency, as that does not conform with the
team’s mindset. They believe in team’s eﬃciency, rather than individual’s.
And they also believe that the individual’s feeling for its own productiveness
is the most accurate measure for its eﬃciency.
Quality assurance
Quality assurance is performed in multiple phases actually. It starts in the
design phase of the SDLC, when the team talks through the potential is-
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sues. Next, Java being their main language, conformance to common coding
standards for Java and additional documents proposed by Telenor Digital, is
checked. Then code review is done, which is followed by unit and acceptance
testing. Last but not the least, code is refactored all the time.
Despite all of these practices, the quality of the software is not measured.
Also, no speciﬁc security testing is performed. Potential security threats are
discussed during the design phase of the SDLC and bad practices are avoided
while coding. Nevertheless, the team is aware of the existence of some design
issues they have to ﬁx, such as securing secrets and sensitive logs and because
of that they would like to have automatic security checks on regular basis.
Development environment
Telco’s developers are free to choose the development software they feel most
comfortable with. Therefore, they develop on all three major OS platforms:
OS X, Windows and Linux. They use various IDEs, such as IntelliJ, Net-
Beans, Emacs, Eclipse, Sublime. . . Their software is mostly written in Java,
but they are also developing parts of it in JavaScript, shell script and Python.
Jenkins is used as a build server for continuous integration. There is a sepa-
rate testing, staging and production environment, which is about to be put
in use in the near future.
4.2.3 Developers personal opinions
We have interviewed 6/8 software engineers, out of which 4 were on a senior
level. The developers programming experience was varying from 4 to 37
years. Most of them did not have any particular experience with security-
oriented tools and showed average familiarity with security vulnerabilities.
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Professional background
Title
Programming
experience
(years)
Experience with
security-oriented tools
Familiarity with security
vulnerabilities (personal
estimate on a 1-5 scale)
Software
engineer 4 Does not recall 2
Senior software
engineer 18 None 3
Senior software
engineer 37 Not in particular 3
Senior software
engineer 20
Has had experience with
static analysis tools 3-4
Senior software
engineer 20 Not in static analysis sense 3
Software
engineer 6 None 4
Table 4.1: Developers professional background.
On the software
Regarding the safety criticality of the software, some of the developers didn’t
feel the software was safety critical at ﬁrst thought. We then established
that their ﬁrst thoughts were related to the overall system stability and the
consequences if it crashes. The system was also assessed as “not very safety
critical” from infrastructure point of view, which would cover the tasks of
handling ﬁrewalls and access rights to their servers. However, when the
matter was considered from privacy and information security point of view,
they all agreed that it is the most critical part of their software, due to the
fact that they store sensitive personal data, such as personal conversations,
messages and voice conversations. It may not be that peoples’ lives are
dependent on it, but leaking some of the highly sensitive information they
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are storing might be quite dangerous.
On static analysis tools
The team has brieﬂy used a static analysis tool called Sonar. They have
implemented it as part of their build server – Jenkins, but it was disabled
at the time the interviews took place, because their build server was bro-
ken. The tool was intended to run when their master branch was built by
the build server and this is the point when issues are reported. The nature
of the reports was not security focused. Alerts pointed to memory errors,
referential loops, coding style, nonconformance to coding standard, declara-
tion of variables, processing methods that are large or complex, test coverage
checks. . . The tool was considered as too strict, as was mostly pointing to
false positives and parts of the code had to be speciﬁcally marked in order
to be skipped by the tool. However, they have acted upon the ﬁndings of
the tool and removed some of the classical bugs from their application. Nev-
ertheless, the infrastructure is ready and set to support the implementation
of additional static analysis tool, unless it is decided to stick to the current
plan, which is to continue using Sonar.
On challenges
At this point, we think it is very important that developers show awareness
of the challenges they might have to face. The most important challenge
is actually setting the tool up and getting it to work. Another challenge
would be to convince the developers in the beneﬁts of the tool in order to
use it. Developers’ greatest fear from implementing an additional tool into
their regular SDLC are the invasiveness and time factors. Most of them are
very optimistic about the positive eﬀects that a static analysis tool will have
on the quality of the code. However, they show concerns about time limita-
tions, which might limit their ability to consider the tools alerts. They even
proposed an idea to schedule a part of their working time for ﬁxing security
issues. Furthermore, they also fear that if the tool requires a lot of interaction
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and reports misleading alerts, it might aﬀect their productiveness and they
may end up ignoring it. Yet another challenge they foresee is covering all of
the programming languages they write code in, as well as the large volume
of code base, which might cause great amounts of additional work on ﬁxing
existing ﬂaws. Also, ﬁxing some of the issues might also cause a conﬂict of
diﬀerent solution proposals. Apart from these challenges, they show aware-
ness that developing with security in mind is harder, but necessary, as at
current point they don’t have any formal method nor formal software tools
to address this and they rely on the general background knowledge of the
developers.
The developers willingness to act upon the ﬁndings of the tool actually
depends on the ﬁndings. As long as real vulnerabilities are in question and
they are not getting huge reports of false positives, developers will be pre-
pared to consider the alerts reported, some would even enjoy learning about
and ﬁxing the issues. However, they could not give a more conﬁdent state-
ment about their willingness to act until they actually experience the tool
personally.
On implementation
All of the developers agreed on the idea of implementing a static analysis tool
both locally, as part of their IDE and remotely, as part of their build server.
All, with the exception of one developer would prefer to have the tool imple-
mented in Jenkins if they have to chose between the two approaches. They
pointed out the beneﬁts of automatic navigation and immediate feedback,
when reports are rendered locally. They can promptly act upon the ﬁndings
while they are still developing that particular part of the code. However, one
of the developers ﬁnds this distracting, as these kind of alerts may interrupt
him and get him out of the ﬂow. On the other hand, having the tool imple-
mented on the build server adds other beneﬁts such as an overview on the
performance metrics of the team as a whole, which they would not be able
to have otherwise.
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4.2.4 Conclusion
In summary, based on the information provided in the interviews we could
conclude that the security of the software is mostly left in the hands of
the developer. It is completely his/her responsibility and is dependent on
his/her own knowledge. Nonetheless, the team is aware of the existence of
some design issues and the need for automating the security testing process
and they are strongly positive about it, so long as they have the funding to
support it.
In order for the implementation and adoption of such a tool to be success-
ful, it is of great importance that the tool requires the least eﬀort and gives
some beneﬁt already in the short term, no matter how small. Therefore,
the independent evaluation of static analysis tools should provide reassur-
ing evidence that the hassle of implementing a particular tool is worthwhile.
Moreover, we have to take great care in properly conﬁguring the tool, so that
it points out to the most relevant issues. We must focus on a set of vulnera-
bilities that will bring added value to the quality of the software. That is a
learning process for the developers as well and it will take time to gain the
knowledge to do it right.
4.3 Independent evaluation of SATs
In the second phase of the study we conducted an independent evaluation of
static analysis tools as security analyzers. The focus of the evaluation was
the tools’ ability to discover potential security vulnerabilities, i.e. ﬂaws that
may eventually cause a failure that can be exploited. This kind of static
code analysis is also known as static application security testing (SAST). In
evaluating the tools, we followed the approach proposed by NSA’s Center for
Assured Software [20].
Firstly, we decided to conduct the evaluation on an existing, artiﬁcial
software in order to simplify the process of evaluation and get more consistent
results. Artiﬁcial software contains intentionally embedded vulnerabilities
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and comes with the beneﬁt of providing information on the exact or at least
approximate location of the ﬂaw. This way, it is easier to separate a true
from a false positive. Therefore, we decided to use an artiﬁcial software
developed speciﬁcally for the purpose of evaluating static analysis tools, that
is the Juliet Test Suite for Java v1.2 [21].
Further, we use CAS’s classiﬁcation of Common Weakness Enumeration
(CWE) entries to a spectrum of weakness classes. Each tool reports vul-
nerabilities in a unique format and each vulnerability is given a tool-speciﬁc
message code. We mapped these codes to appropriate weaknesses deﬁned
in the Common Weakness Enumeration list. Each CWE detected by a tool
was then classiﬁed in one of the following classes: authentication and access
control, buﬀer handling, buﬀer overﬂow, code quality, dead code, control ﬂow
management, race condition, encryption and randomness, error handling, ﬁle
handling, information leaks, initialization and shutdown, injection, miscella-
neous, number handling and pointer and reference handling.
Lastly, the true positive (TP) rate and the discrimination rate for each
weakness class, for each of the tools, following the approach used in [20]. The
SATs were later evaluated on the basis of that data.
4.3.1 Juliet Test Suite
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Software Assur-
ance Reference Dataset (SARD) Project provides a collection of test suites
intended for the purpose of evaluating security tools’ performance on dis-
covering security vulnerabilities in a source code [21]. A future goal of the
dataset is to cover all phases in a software development life cycle (SDLC),
from the initial concept, through design and implementation, to acceptance,
deployment, and operation. Therefore, for the purposes of the independent
evaluation of SATs performed in this project, we decided to use a test suite
created by NSA’s CAS. The Juliet Test Suite v1.2 for Java was chosen be-
cause it is speciﬁcally developed for assessing the capabilities of SATs, as this
project particularly focuses on improving the implementation phase of the
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SDLC automated static analysis integration in the deployment pipeline.
The test suite contains 25,477 test cases with 841 ﬂaw types embedded in
various control-ﬂow and data-ﬂow patterns. The complete Juliet Test Suite
v1.2 for Java covers 112 CWEs, a subset of which covers 11 out of the 2011
CWE/SANS Top 25 list of security ﬂaws [22]. The test cases represent a
sample of artiﬁcial software that has these ﬂaws embedded in the source
code. Each test case targets one particular ﬂaw which relates to a most rel-
evant CWE entry, however, other ﬂaws may also be unintentionally present.
Therefore, each test case contains exactly one primary bad and one primary
good method, which in addition may contain a call to another secondary
bad/good construct consequently.
4.3.2 CWE/SANS Top 25
The MITRE Corporation is a non-for-proﬁt organization and its main role
is the operation of research and development centers. Under the sponsorship
of this organization, a community-developed formal list of common software
weakness types has been created, named Common Weakness Enumeration
(CWE) [23]. CWE is a dictionary that provides information on existing
software security ﬂaws, which can help to identify and mitigate software
security vulnerabilities. The dictionary can also be used as a baseline for
comparison of security software that targets these ﬂaws.
In cooperation with the SANS Institute, as well as other security experts,
together they have created and maintain the CWE/SANS Top 25 list of
most dangerous software errors, which uses the Common Weakness Scoring
System (CWSS) to rank the errors [24]. The ranking is based on several
factors, such as attack frequency, impact or consequences, prevalence, and
ease of detection among others.
The table bellow shows the CWE/SANS Top 25 coverage and it also
presents the mapping between the CWEs reported by CAS and the actual
2011 CWE/SANS Top 25 list of CWE entries. The last column represents the
number of test cases in the Juliet Test Suite v1.2 that relate to a particular
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CWE.
2011 CWE/SANS Top 25 CAS Test Cases
Rank CWE Entry CWE Entry / Entries Java
1 CWE-89:Improper Neutraliza-
tion of Special Elements used
in an SQL Command (’SQL In-
jection’)
CWE-89 2220
2 CWE-78: Improper Neutral-
ization of Special Elements
used in an OS Command (’OS
Command Injection’)
CWE-78 444
4 CWE-79: Improper Neutral-
ization of Input During Web
Page Generation (’Cross-site
Scripting’)
CWE-80: Improper Neu-
tralization of Script-Related
HTML Tags in a Web Page
(Basic XSS), CWE-81: Im-
proper Neutralization of
Script in an Error Message
Web Page, CWE-83: Im-
proper Neutralization of
Script in Attributes in a Web
Page
1332
7 CWE-798: Use of Hard-coded
Credentials
CWE-259: Use of Hard-coded
Password, CWE-321: Use
of Hard-coded Cryptographic
Key
148
8 CWE-311: Missing Encryption
of Sensitive Data
CWE-315: Plaintext Storage
in a Cookie, CWE-319: Clear-
text Transmission of Sensitive
Information
407
13 CWE-22: Improper Limitation
of a Pathname to a Restricted
Directory (’Path Traversal’)
CWE-23: Relative Path
Traversal, CWE-36: Absolute
Path Traversal
888
19 CWE-327: Use of a Broken
or Risky Cryptographic Algo-
rithm
CWE-327 34
22 CWE-601: URL Redirection
to Untrusted Site (’Open Redi-
rect’)
CWE-601 333
23 CWE-134: Uncontrolled For-
mat String
CWE-134 666
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24 CWE-190: Integer Overflow or
Wraparound
CWE-190, CWE-191: In-
teger Underflow (Wrap or
Wraparound)
4255
25 CWE-759: Use of a One-Way
Hash without a Salt
CWE-759 17
Table 4.2: CWE/SANS Top 25 - Juliet test suite coverage.
The table bellow shows the rest of the CWE/SANS Top 25 list which is
not covered in the Juliet Test Suite v1.2 for Java.
2011 CWE/SANS Top 25 CAS Test Cases
Rank CWE Entry CWE Entry / Entries Java
3 CWE-120: Buffer Copy with-
out Checking Size of Input
(’Classic Buffer Overflow’)
None (Buffer Handling issues
are covered in the related
C/C++ test cases)
-
9 CWE-434: Unrestricted Up-
load of File with Dangerous
Type
None (Design issue which does
not fit into CAS Test Case
structure)
-
10 CWE-807: Reliance on Un-
trusted Inputs in a Security
Decision
None (Covered in the related
C/C++ test cases)
-
11 CWE-250: Execution with Un-
necessary Privileges
None (Design issue which does
not fit into CAS Test Case
structure)
-
12 CWE-352: Cross-Site Request
Forgery (CSRF)
None (Design issue which does
not fit into CAS Test Case
structure)
-
14 CWE-494: Download of Code
Without Integrity Check
None (Design issue which does
not fit into CAS Test Case
structure)
-
15 CWE-863: Incorrect Autho-
rization
None (Design issue which does
not fit into CAS Test Case
structure)
-
16 CWE-829: Inclusion of Func-
tionality from Untrusted Con-
trol Sphere
None (Design issue which does
not fit into CAS Test Case
structure)
-
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17 CWE-732: Incorrect Permis-
sion Assignment for Critical
Resource
None (Design issue which does
not fit into CAS Test Case
structure)
-
18 CWE-676: Use of Potentially
Dangerous Function
None (Covered in the related
C/C++ test cases)
-
20 CWE-131: Incorrect Calcula-
tion of Buffer Size
None (Does not fit into CAS
Test Case structure for Java)
-
21 CWE-307: Improper Restric-
tion of Excessive Authentica-
tion Attempts
None (Design issue which does
not fit into CAS Test Case
structure)
-
Table 4.3: CWE/SANS Top 25 - entries not covered by the Juliet test suite.
4.3.3 Selected tools
In order to identify which SAT would best ﬁt the needs in the given context,
we have evaluated a set of tools that can be used for this intent in order
to asses which of the tools will be most appropriate for the purpose of our
further research. We used SAMATE’s list of static source code scanners as
a starting point in our selection process [25]. In addition, we also used other
resources and information available on the Web. At last, we have made a
selection of tools based on the language support, easiness of installation and
conﬁguration and appropriateness in terms of the process of comparison. We
have selected ﬁve static analysis tools which focus on ﬁnding security ﬂaws:
FindBugs and its plug-in FindSecurityBugs, SonarQube, JLint, Lapse+ and
a commercial static code analyzer.
FindBugs. FindBugs is a static source code analyzer which uses static
analysis to look for ﬂaws in Java software. It is an open source software,
distributed under the terms of the Lesser GNU Public License. FindBugs
analyzes the Java compiled classes, rather than the source code. The software
is distributed as a stand-alone GUI application, but there are also plug-ins
available for Eclipse, NetBeans, IntelliJ IDEA, Gradle, Hudson, Maven and
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Jenkins.
Supported languages: Java.
Supported IDEs: Eclipse - versions: Mars (4.5), Luna (4.4), Kepler (4.3),
Juno (4.2, 3.8), Previous to Juno (<=4.1), Neon (4.6).
Platform Support: Windows, Mac, Linux/GTK.
In order to narrow down the list of generated alerts to the focus of our
interest, we executed the FindBugs standalone application and ﬁltered only
the ’bugs’ found under the "SECURITY" category.
FindSecurityBugs. FindSecurityBugs is a FindBugs plug-in for security
audits of Java web applications.
During the second approach, we added the FindSecurityBugs plug-in for
FindBugs in Eclipse and we ran the plug-in, with the "SECURITY" category
marked only and switched oﬀ all detectors in other categories. As expected,
this approach yielded signiﬁcantly more speciﬁc results, as the plug-in dis-
covered much more security related ﬂaws.
SonarQube. SonarQube software (previously called Sonar) is an open source
solution performing quality analysis on source code. We have chosen the
SonarQube Scanner for our analysis, as it provides a possibility to launch
analysis from the command line.
Supported languages: ABAP, C/C++, C#, COBOL, CSS, Erlang, Flex/Ac-
tionScript, Groovy, Java, Java Properties, JavaScript, JSON, Objective-C,
PHP, PL/I, PL/SQL, Puppet, Python, RPG, Swift, VB.NET, Visual Basic
6, Web, XML.
Platform Support: Windows, Mac, Linux/GTK.
Jlint. Similarly as FindBugs, Jlint also operates on Java bytecode. It per-
forms a global control-ﬂow and a local data ﬂow analysis. Three main groups
of messages are produced by Jlint: synchronization, inheritance and data
ﬂow. Jlint is distributed under the General GNU Public License version
2.0 (GPLv2). Binaries are available for the Windows platform and it must
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be compiled form the source code for other platforms. However, we didn’t
manage to achieve this on OS X platform, so we ran the tool on a Windows
platform.
Platform Support: Windows, Linux/GTK.
Lapse+. Lapse+ is an Eclipse plug-in which also performs static analysis
of code with the purpose of detecting security ﬂaws caused by the inadequate
or non-existent validation of the user input data in Java EE Applications. It
is an enhanced version of LAPSE, a software that was developed by the SUIF
Compiler Group of Stanford University and LAPSE stands for Lightweight
Analysis for Program Security in Eclipse. Lapse+ is distributed under the
terms of the GNU General Public License version 3.0.
We have examined the ﬁrst two out of the three approaches provided by
Lapse+ to detect security ﬂaws in a source code:
• Vulnerability Source: searches for points of code that can potentially
be source of an attack.
• Vulnerability Sink: searches for points of code that can potentially be
subjected to data injection.
• Provenance Tracker: performs backward propagation through the dif-
ferent assignations in order to determine if untrusted data may suc-
ceed in manipulating the behaviour of the website. When Vulnerabil-
ity Source is reached from a Vulnerability Sink, it indicates a security
vulnerability.
Supported languages: Java - version 1.6 or higher.
Supported IDEs: Eclipse Helios. Note: the standalone jar did not work
for us on a OS X platform.
Commercial static code analyzer. The commercial static code analyzer
performs static analysis on the source code for ﬁnding security ﬂaws. It also
provides explanations on the vulnerabilities, as well as remediation guidance.
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Supported languages: ABAP/BSP, ActionScript/MXML (Flex), ASP.NET,
VB.NET, C# (.NET), C/C++, Classic ASP (w/VBScript), COBOL, Cold-
Fusion CFML, HTML, Java (including Android), JavaScript/AJAX, JSP,
Objective-C, PHP, PL/SQL, Python, T-SQL, Ruby, Swift, Visual Basic, VB-
Script and XML.
Supported IDEs: Eclipse, IntelliJ Ultimate, IntelliJ Community Android
Studio, IBM Rational Application Developer (RAD), IBM Rational Software
Architect (RSA), Microsoft R© Visual Studio.
4.3.4 Initial idea
At ﬁrst, the idea was to run the tools against a benchmark tool [26] using
the set of test cases provided by the Jiliet Test Suite v1.2 for Java [21]
and compare their performance. The idea of this approach was to help us
generate statistical data about the tools’ capabilities in terms of true/false
positives/negatives alerts rates and range of detectable security bugs. On
the basis of this data we would later make an informed decision about which
tool to choose for further examination.
However, we came to a conclusion that the approach did not quite ﬁt
our needs. The OWASP Benchmark Project oﬀers a very powerful open test
suite designed to evaluate the speed, coverage, and accuracy of automated
static, dynamic and interactive application security testing tools. The 1.2
beta version of the test suite is an executable web application which contains
around 3000 test cases, which are mapped to an appropriate CWE number for
the vulnerabilities they present. Despite supporting these features, we found
extending the base test suite with additional test cases a bit complicated and
time consuming. The project is very well adapted for testing and comparing
tools against the set of test cases it already contains itself, but we ran into
diﬃculties adapting it to run with the additional test cases oﬀered by the
Juliet Test Suite v 1.2 for Java.
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4.3.5 Our approach
Because of the diﬃculties we experienced, we decided to search for a more
appropriate solution for our approach that would oﬀer an automated scanning
of the particular test suite and comparison of the generated reports. The
model suggested by Wagner in [27] described an approach that addressed
the exact same setbacks.
Error types. Each tool reports vulnerabilities in a unique format which
makes the comparison of tools a somewhat cumbersome process. In order
to be able to compare the ﬂaw detection scanners, we have to ﬁt various
result forms into a uniform format. This is done by the Metric Output
Transformer (MOT) tool developed as part of the project Software Project
Quality Reporter (SPQR) [28]. The MOT tool transforms each report into a
CSV ﬁle, where each line contains details about each detected ﬂaw, such as:
name of the scanner, abbreviation of the error reported by the scanner, name
of the ﬁle and line number where the error was spotted, as well as an error
message reported by the scanner. The errors reported in the CSV reports
are then mapped to CWE numbers using a tool-speciﬁc CWE mapping ﬁles,
which are available in appendix B. These mapping ﬁles serve the purpose
of mapping the tool-speciﬁc message codes to the most appropriate CWE
number where possible, or even to multiple CWE numbers in some cases.
Error locations. Where possible, the exact error locations of the ﬂaws
embedded in the test suite were identiﬁed and based on this information we
could determine the number of reported ﬂaws that matched the exact line.
We refer to these matches as correct line matches. Otherwise, the range of
lines where a ﬂaw was intentionally embedded was determined by identifying
the lines of the opening and closing brackets of bad code constructs.
Automated analysis and comparison. Another setback in performing
comparison of software vulnerability detection tools is the cumbersome pro-
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cess of running each tool separately and comparing their performance against
a deﬁned list of vulnerabilities. For this purpose, Wagner has developed a
utility program [29] that automates the process by nailing it down to four
simple steps:
1. Running a scan on the Juliet Test Suite to locate the lines of errors.
2. Running the static analysis scanners against the test suite.
3. Converting the reports of the scanners to a uniform format.
4. Comparing the results and generating an overall report to show the
scanners’ performance.
The initial idea was to run all of the tools from the command line and
automate the whole process from the starting point of execution, through
the generation of reports and transformation to a uniform format, CWE
mapping of the ﬂaws detected and ﬁnally, to the comparison of results. As
neat as this idea sounds, it turned out to impose a lot of limitations on the
selection of tools, as we were limited to only use tools that provided the
possibility to be executed from the command line. We only managed to do
this for two tools on the same OS X platform: FindBugs and SonarQube
(sonar-runner) and Jlint on a diﬀerent Windows platform. Nevertheless, we
then considered the possibility to generate results for each tool separately
and manually transform the results to the uniform CSV format expected by
the comparison tool developed by Wagner. In addition to this, a separate ﬁle
for each tool had to be created that would map the tool-speciﬁc error to the
most appropriate CWE(s), which is expected as an input by the comparison
tool (appendix B).
4.3.6 Weakness classes
Each tool uses diﬀerent techniques for identifying programming ﬂaws and
targets diverse ﬂaw types. In some cases, even tools that target the same
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ﬂaw type may be capable of ﬁnding diﬀerent variants of the ﬂaw. Hereby, a
tool’s speciﬁc capabilities vary signiﬁcantly across diﬀerent SATs. In order
to perform a better evaluation of the tools, we decided to identify the strong
and weak areas of each scanner. To that aim, the CWEs contained in the
Juliet test suite were further segmented to the following specter of weakness
classes, as suggested in [20]:
• Authentication and Access Control
• Buﬀer Handling
• Code Quality
• Control Flow Management
• Encryption and Randomness
• Error Handling
• File Handling
• Information Leaks
• Initialization and Shutdown
• Injection
• Malicious Logic
• Miscellaneous
• Number Handling
• Pointer and Reference Handling
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4.3.7 Improvements
The utility program already mentioned, which is used for the purposes of the
independent evaluation is called AnalyzeTool [29]. The program developed
by Andreas Wagner, automates the process of analysis and comparison of
static software security scanners. The program is written in Python and it
is publicly available on Github. We used the code as basis for performing an
independent evaluation of SATs. However, during the process of evaluation
we discovered a few bugs in the code, which we amended. We also added
some additional features to satisfy the needs of our goals. The extension of
the tool is available at [30]. Generally, we made the following improvements:
• The tool did not perform recursive scanning of the ﬁles in the test suite
and a subset of the code (contained in subfolders) was omitted from
the reports.
• FindBugs CWE mappings were extended.
• The evaluation process was completely automated for SonarQube. Ad-
ditional logic was added to the analyzer tool that transforms the reports
in XML format from the original JSON format reported by the tool.
Additionally, a SonarQube metaﬁle was added to the MOT tool that
transforms the report from XML format to the expected CSV format.
SonarQube CWE mappings were also added.
• The evaluation process was semi-automated for FindSecurityBugs, as
the reports had to be generated externally. A FindSecurityBugs metaﬁle
was added to the MOT tool that transforms the report from XML for-
mat to the expected CSV format. FindSecurityBugs CWE mappings
were also added.
• The evaluation process was semi-automated for Lapse+, as the reports
had to be generated externally. The reports were then manually ﬁtted
to the appropriate CSV format. Lapse+ CWE mappings were also
added.
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• The evaluation process was semi-automated for the commercial tool
evaluated in the study, as the reports had to be generated externally.
The reports were then manually ﬁtted to the appropriate CSV format.
CWE mappings for the commercial tool were also added.
• Missing mappings of CWEs to weakness classes were added.
• A bug was detected in the counting of the issues and was amended
appropriately.
• We considered the labeling of "real positives" meaning "number of is-
sues which are found in ﬁles where also Juliet-Testsuite Issues are doc-
umented" to be misleading and changed it to "issues reported in bad
test cases".
4.3.8 Results
Environment setup
The following environment setup was used to perform an independent eval-
uation:
OS platforms: OS X, Windows 10 (virtual machine).
Virtualization software: VMware Fusion.
Prerequisites: Python, Java, ant.
IDE: PyCharm EDU, Eclipse Helios, Eclipse Mars.
Tools: Commercial tool (launched as a standalone application); Find-
SecurityBugs, Lapse+ (run as plug-ins); FindBugs, SonarQube, Jlint
(launched from the command line).
Test suite: Juliet Test Suite v1.2 for Java.
Utility program for automated comparison: AnalyzeTool [29].
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Data collected
On the basis of the information collected from the tool, the following data is
computed for each tool:
• correct line matches (CLM): issues of correct CWE type found at
a correct line,
• diﬀerent line matches (DLM): issues of correct CWE type found
at a diﬀerent line,
• range matches (RM): issues of correct CWE type found within a
deﬁned range,
• diﬀerent type matches (DTM): issues of false CWE type found at
a correct line,
• none matching: issues which are not documented in the testsuite,
• no CWE: issues that are not mapped to a CWE,
• issues reported in bad test cases (IBT): number of issues which
are found in ﬁles where also Juliet-Testsuite issues are documented,
• other issues (OI): issues found in ﬁles where no issues should be
found.
Results classiﬁcation
In general, when scanners are assessed, the following categories of reported
errors are considered:
• true positives (TP): an existent ﬂaw is correctly detected,
• false positives (FP): a non-existent ﬂaw is detected,
• true negatives (TN): a non-existent ﬂaw is correctly not detected,
• false negatives (FN): an existent ﬂaw is not detected.
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Metrics computed
Because of the limitations of the AnalyzeTool stated in subsection 4.3.7 and
the lack of appropriate information in the data collected by the tool in order
to compute the evaluation metrics, we did not feel safe to use the collected
data for evaluation of the tools. Instead, a separate metric computation tool
was developed by Tosin D. Oyetoyan to support the AnalyzeTool. Based
on the CSV reports and the CWE mappings for each tool, the support tool
collected the following data:
• diﬀerent line matches (DLM): issues of correct CWE type found
at a diﬀerent line„
• range matches (RM): issues of correct CWE type found within a
deﬁned range,
• discriminations (Disc.): issues of correct CWE type found within a
deﬁned range, without incorrectly reporting the issue in a non-ﬂawed
code[20],
• incidental ﬂaws (IF): ﬂaws found in ﬁles which are not the target of
the test case.
Based on the data collected, the following metrics were computed:
TPrate =
#RM
#RM +#DLM
(true positive rate) (4.1)
DRate =
#Disc
#RM +#DLM
(discrimination rate) [20] (4.2)
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4.3.9 Scanner results
Commercial tool
Weakness Class # RM # DLM # Disc. # IF
TPrate
(%)
DRate
(%)
Authentication
and Access Control 206 244 161 8213 45.78 35.78
Code Quality 26 129 20 2238 16.77 12.9
Control Flow
Management 3 83 3 6597 3.48 3.48
Encryption and
Randomness 12 147 6 17522 7.54 3.77
Error Handling 0 17 0 1187 0 0
File Handling 0 0 0 16512 0 0
Information Leaks 18 50 18 1734 26.47 26.47
Initialization and
Shutdown 1 19 1 43481 5 5
Injection 1560 2662 695 160327 39.95 16.46
Malicious Logic 5 49 3 3306 9.26 5.55
Miscellaneous 8 12 8 996 40 40
Number Handling 0 0 0 94501 0 0
Pointer and Ref.
Handling 55 216 26 3948 20.3 9.59
Table 4.4: Commercial tool results.
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FindBugs
Weakness Class # RM # DLM # Disc. # IF
TPrate
(%)
DRate
(%)
Authentication
and Access Control 1 0 1 176 100 100
Code Quality 34 3 34 88 91.89 91.89
Control Flow
Management 34 0 34 220 100 100
Encryption and
Randomness 0 0 0 312 0 0
Error Handling 17 0 17 284 100 100
File Handling 34 1 34 438 97.14 97.14
Information Leaks 0 0 0 7 0 0
Initialization and
Shutdown 19 1 19 6132 95 95
Injection 123 5 123 10521 96.09 96.09
Malicious Logic 0 0 0 135 0 0
Miscellaneous 34 0 34 2 100 100
Number Handling 0 0 0 3726 0 0
Pointer and Ref.
Handling 130 89 45 203 59.36 20.55
Table 4.5: FindBugs results.
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FindSecurityBugs
Weakness Class # RM # DLM # Disc. # IF
TPrate
(%)
DRate
(%)
Authentication
and Access Control 272 62 271 245 81.44 81.44
Code Quality 0 0 0 4 0 0
Control Flow
Management 0 0 0 180 0 0
Encryption and
Randomness 141 154 35 1632 47.8 11.86
Error Handling 0 0 0 282 0 0
File Handling 30 2 30 682 93.75 93.75
Information Leaks 0 0 0 147 0 0
Initialization and
Shutdown 0 0 0 742 0 0
Injection 2465 669 2458 8906 78.65 78.43
Malicious Logic 16 0 16 293 100 100
Miscellaneous 0 0 0 2 0 0
Number Handling 0 0 0 1785 0 0
Table 4.6: FindSecurityBugs results.
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SonarQube
Weakness Class # RM # DLM # Disc. # IF
TPrate
(%)
DRate
(%)
Authentication
and Access Control 1 0 1 3244 100 100
Code Quality 102 54 50 1886 65.38 32.05
Control Flow
Management 28 1 28 4093 96.55 96.55
Encryption and
Randomness 0 0 0 6153 0 0
Error Handling 14 0 14 833 100 100
File Handling 0 0 0 9842 0 0
Information Leaks 0 0 0 1018 0 0
Initialization and
Shutdown 15 2 14 26627 88.24 82.35
Injection 311 673 133 91653 31.6 13.52
Malicious Logic 17 33 2 1498 34 4
Miscellaneous 8 0 8 585 100 100
Number Handling 0 0 0 59675 0 0
Pointer and Ref.
Handling 49 36 40 3139 57.65 47.06
Table 4.7: SonarQube results.
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Lapse+
Weakness Class # RM # DLM # Disc. # IF
TPrate
(%)
DRate
(%)
Authentication
and Access Control 0 0 0 245 0 0
Code Quality 0 0 0 49 0 0
Control Flow
Management 0 0 0 528 0 0
Encryption and
Randomness 0 0 0 100 0 0
Error Handling 0 0 0 2 0 0
File Handling 552 576 24 469 48.94 2.13
Information Leaks 0 0 0 360 0 0
Initialization and
Shutdown 0 0 0 1970 0 0
Injection 1998 2160 84 11024 48.05 2.02
Malicious Logic 0 0 0 48 0 0
Miscellaneous 0 0 0 2 0 0
Number Handling 0 0 0 3977 0 0
Pointer and Ref.
Handling 0 0 0 176 0 0
Table 4.8: Lapse+ results.
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Jlint
Weakness Class # RM # DLM # Disc. # IF
TPrate
(%)
DRate
(%)
Authentication
and Access Control 0 0 0 22 0 0
Code Quality 3 0 3 45 100 100
Control Flow
Management 0 0 0 33 0 0
Encryption and
Randomness 0 0 0 17 0 0
Error Handling 0 0 0 7 0 0
File Handling 0 0 0 79 0 0
Information Leaks 0 0 0 9 0 0
Initialization and
Shutdown 0 0 0 3 0 0
Injection 0 0 0 87 0 0
Malicious Logic 0 0 0 63 0 0
Miscellaneous 17 0 17 22 100 100
Number Handling 0 0 0 3 0 0
Pointer and Ref.
Handling 105 26 84 196 80.15 64.12
Table 4.9: Jlint results.
4.3.10 Conclusion
Based on the data computed on the true positive rate and the discrimina-
tion rate, we have enough support information to provide a reﬂection on
the tools performances.The results calculated for each weakness class sepa-
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rately, clearly show that the tools capabilities signiﬁcantly vary across diﬀer-
ent weakness classes.
Although the overall results on the performance of the commercial tool
are generally better than the general performance of the rest of the tools
across the specter of weakness classes, there are certain weakness classes,
such as "Error Handling" "File Handling" and "Number Handling" in which
the tool showed weak performance. On the other hand, FindBugs performed
signiﬁcantly better in the "Error Handling" and "File Handling" weakness
classes, but showed poor performance in the "Encryption and Randomness",
"Information Leaks", "Malicious Logic" and "Number Handling" weakness
classes.
These conclusions hold for the overall results calculated for the rest of
the tools as well. This leads us to a conclusion that a team can either make
an informed decision about the choice of a static analysis tool based on its
speciﬁc needs, or the team can use a combination of various static analysis
tools in order to cover the complete specter of weakness classes.
4.4 Post-implementation evaluation
During the process of implementation of a static analysis tool at a soft-
ware vendor, it is expected that both technical and non-technical challenges
will appear. Technical challenges may appear during installation and con-
ﬁguration. On a non technical note, it may also happen that developers’
insuﬃcient security awareness hinders the way to a smooth integration pro-
cess. Moreover, the integration of an SAT in an agile software development
lifecycle may also cause disruptions in the regular ﬂow and therefore, cause
additional challenges.
As can be concluded by the context analysis of the industry setting where
the tool was implemented, no objective measurements on the team’s eﬃciency
are performed. Therefore, in order to measure how successful the implemen-
tation of the SAT was and what kind of eﬀect it will have on the development
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work ﬂow, we had to take a diﬀerent approach and decided to collect that
information via a questionnaire, available in appendix C. The questionnaire
was answered by the developer responsible for the implementation process.
It covered four categories of our main interest, that are further elaborated
into greater detail.
Future use intention: The developer expresses positive thoughts about
the team’s future intention of using the tool. He believes that the team will
eventually start using the tool in the future and that they will dedicate a
part of their sprint time intended especially in solving issues reported by the
tool.
Perceived usefulness: He is however, not convinced in the tools’ use-
fulness and potential to reduce the number of serious security defects and
consequently, improve the security of their product. He is skeptical about
the tools eﬀectiveness in ﬁnding real vulnerabilities and expresses higher ex-
pectations from the tool. In his personal opinion, the perceived usefulness
of the tool "mainly depends on the functional domain, since this tool is very
much needed for ﬁnancial domain for its PCI DSS certiﬁcation, but not so
relevant for other domains".
On a more positive note, he believes that advantages of using the tool
outweigh the disadvantages and believes that the implementation of the tool
will raise developers’ security awareness and teach them good coding security
practices. He disagrees that the tool will distract developers in their work,
have negative eﬀect on the team’s atmosphere, conﬁdence, focus and their
ability to deliver.
Perceived compatibility: The developer disagrees that the tool is com-
patible with the way he or the team organize their work, but remains conﬁ-
dent that it will be best practice to implement the tool both locally and on
the build server.
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In his personal words: "The tool ﬁts perfectly with Waterfall SDLC, but
is not perfect ﬁt for Agile/Scrum SDLC. The concept of "version" in this
tool is based on legacy development strategy to have the analysis run on
main code branch. It does not ﬁt perfectly with concept of feature branches
(feature being developed on these branches) and quality gates, such as al-
low/reject merging of these feature branches with the main branch based on
automated testes or relative statistics from static code analysis, which Sonar-
Qube had, e.g. allow to merge if increase in low priority issues, in feature
branch compared to main branch, are less than 5%."
Subjective norm: The developer is clear about his subjective attitude and
states that no one has inﬂuenced his opinion in any way.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
The use of automated static code analysis in agile software development is
used for early detection of programming errors which may potentially lead to
failures that can be later exploited as vulnerabilities. The use of automated
SAST is intended to reduce development time and costs and improve the
quality of the software in the long run. It is researchers’ aim to push the
boundaries of such testing forward and suggest possible ways of integrating
SAST into the regular SDLC, in order to help development teams optimize
the process for themselves.
This study elaborates diverse aspects on the idea of integrating automated
static code analysis in agile software development. The study contributes to
the researchers’ aim by identifying the most important factors for adopting
a particular tool by a team in an industrial setting. The case study provides
evidence that show the importance of least eﬀort requirements by the tool
in order to achieve successful implementation. The tool must also be able
to show beneﬁts already in the short term, no matter how small, in order to
persuade the team in its capabilities and motivate them for future use.
Furthermore, the work also identiﬁes the SAST tools capabilities in order
to make informed suggestions that meet developers’ expectations and in that
way, support adoption of such tools in general. This study shows that a
combination of SAST tools should be implemented in order to cover the
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entire specter of possible weaknesses. However, it is up to the team itself to
choose the most adequate approach to SAST adoption, the one that best ﬁts
their speciﬁc needs.
Nonetheless, we also experienced some diﬃculties in the process of con-
ducting the case study and ran into obstacles, which we believe may have
hindered our ﬁndings. During the evaluation phase of static analysis tools,
true positives not intentionally embedded in the test suite could not be dis-
tinguished from the rest of the incidental ﬂaws, as a human expert would
have to manually review the list of ﬁndings and identify a particular ﬁnding
as a weakness that needs to be ﬁxed. Otherwise, a ﬁnding which may actu-
ally be a true positive is considered as a false positive. Another limitation
to yielding better results in the independent evaluation phase might have
been the incomplete CWE mappings ﬁles for some of the classes, as not all
vendors provide information on the tool’s CWE mappings.
Further, due to lack of time during the implementation of the commercial
tool, we did not manage to identify the real challenges of implementation,
the eﬀects on the regular development ﬂow, or to assess the eﬀect of the
tool on the quality of the code in the long run. The questionnaire can only
be considered as a conclusion and a reﬂection on what we have done, but
cannot assess the developers’ general opinion. This data would have been
very beneﬁcial and further research in that direction is strongly encouraged.
In general, the ﬁndings of this work shed more light on the challenges
developers are faced with when implementing a static code analysis tool for
security audit in an agile settings. The study also provides an assessment on
the capabilities of diﬀerent tools, their weak and strong areas, as important
factors for adopting a particular tool. Moreover, the study explains the
obstacles that make the process of evaluation rather challenging.
Finally, the work sets solid grounds for further research in this area.
As this work did not manage to automate the entire evaluation process of
SATs, that might be a potential idea for future research work that will further
support the adoption of SATs for security audit in agile software development.
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Appendix A
Pre-implementation phase:
Interview transcriptions
AGENDA: Qualitative data collection
Professional background.
Personal view on system and security analysis.
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS
Professional background
1. What is your job title?
2. How many years of programming experience do you have?
3. Have you had any previous experience with security-oriented tools? If
yes, please share some details (what kind of experience, which tools,
when).
4. How familiar with security vulnerabilities are you? (1-5)
Personal opinion (on system and security analysis)
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1. How safety-critical is the software you are developing? (1-5)
2. How do you feel about bringing software security into operations?
Would you ﬁnd it distracting or helpful?
3. Which static analysis tools do you already use?
4. Have you used them to ﬁnd speciﬁc security defects (Weaknesses and
vulnerabilities)?
5. Do you fear the impact of implementing additional security tools on
the workﬂow of your team?
6. Are you prepared to act upon the ﬁndings of the security tool?
7. What challenges do you envisage/foresee?
8. Does the team have the skill to use the static analysis tool?
9. Which do you prefer – IDE integrated static analysis tool or report
generated by static analysis tool after build? Why?
Agile practices
1. Which agile methodology does the team use?
2. How often do you release versions of the product?
3. How do you measure developers’ eﬃciency?
4. How do you estimate the team’s velocity per iteration?
5. Could you provide data/project burndown charts for the past year?
6. What is the usual time length of one iteration?
7. What sequential processes are contained in/describe each iteration?
8. Do they have speciﬁc, documented coding practices?
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9. Do you practice pair programming?
10. Do you practice refactoring of the code?
Development environment
1. Which OS platform do you use?
2. Which IDE do you use?
3. Which programming language do you use?
4. Which continuous integration tool do you use?
5. Do you have a separate testing, staging and production environment?
Quality assurance (QA) and security
1. How do you measure the quality of the software?
2. What are your usual QA practices?
3. Which testing tools do you already use?
4. Which security testing tools do you already use?
5. At which point in the SDLC do you check for security vulnerabilities?
6. Are there any speciﬁc security vulnerabilities you would like to address?
If yes, which ones would you point out?
7. In your opinion, what are the important factors necessary for adoption
of static analysis tool for the team?
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WHEN: 19 MAY 2016 at 11:00 AM
WHERE: Online
ATTENDEES: Developer 1, Bisera Milosheska
BM: What is your job title?
KM: Software engineer.
BM: How many years of programming experience do you have?
KM: About 4 years in this job, previously I was in a diﬀerent function.
BM: Have you had any previous experience with security-oriented tools?
KM: Not that I know.
BM: How familiar with security vulnerabilities are you? Cross-site script-
ing, SQL Injection, do you know what they mean, how they can aﬀect
the software. . . ?
KM: We are well aware of it. It has not been main concern, it’s not some-
thing that anybody thinks that much about when you do program-
ming. But I am aware of the issues.
BM: Let’s say on a scale from 1 to 5, how familiar are you with security
vulnerabilities?
KM: 2 maybe.
BM: How safety-critical is the software you are developing? On a scale
from 1 to 5, how would you estimate it?
KM: I don’t really know what you mean by safety-critical, but it’s a Tele-
com so I would say it is 5.
BM: It’s 5, yes. Because you are probably working with a lot of personal
data that can be exposed.
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KM: Yes, personal data and also I am working mainly with telecom side
and I have issues like network interconnection and correctness and
that kind of things. I would say that it’s important, I would say 5,
yes.
BM: How do you feel about bringing software security into operations?
Would you ﬁnd it distracting or helpful?
KM: I think it depends on how invasive it is. But I ﬁnd that it will be
helpful. It all depends what we are talking about.
BM: In which way it is implemented, probably?
KM: If it requires more work, you can say, and enforces a more strict way
of developing things.
BM: Which static analysis tools do you already use? Do you use any?
KM: We have brieﬂy been using code analysis tool, Sonar. It is kind of a
tool that basically analyses your source code and ﬂags issues with the
source code. (The Sonar tool for code analysis.)
BM: So do you ﬁx these issues that are ﬂagged? Do you use it regularly?
KM: Currently (i.e. Sonar) it is actually disabled, but it is part of our build
setup. We develop software locally, on our laptops and we deploy it
to a software repository, in our case is Github. And when we push
to the “master” branch virtually a master branch on Github, we have
this backend service called Jenkins, which will build software. And as
part of that build Jenkins will invoke this Sonar backend build, it is a
kind of analysis tool and it will report back potential issues with the
code. As we are speaking, that part is disabled. But we have been
using it and the plan is to use it again.
BM: Have you used SonarQube to ﬁnd any speciﬁc security defects, vul-
nerabilities, weaknesses?
KM: It’s mainly... You can ﬁnd code that is not correct code, but test
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coverage. It also point all memory errors or code test coverage checks.
But I am not overall familiar. . .
BM: Have you sanitised any of those errors that the tool reported?
KM: It is list of issues that it reports and then go to and correct things.
But often it points those things that I actually think are not real
errors (but code that breaks with the coding standard enforced by
the tool) - appear as they are, it also points on things like how you do
declaration of things, or you declare variables and such. And it has
a bit strict way of what it accepts and in some cases I do actually go
into the code and mark the code as a code that should be skipped by
the tool.
BM: But do you think that some of the reported vulnerabilities can be
ignored? Because the tool has set up too strict rules?
KM: Yes, the majority of things it reports are useful.
BM: Do you fear the impact of implementing additional security tools on
the workﬂow of the team?
KM: Not if it works the way that we are using this Sonar tool.
BM: So you would prefer to have it in the build server?
KM: Yes, that’s correct.
BM: Are you prepared to act upon the ﬁndings of the security tool?
KM: Yes.
BM: I suppose you are, because you already said that you are doing that.
BM: What challenges do you foresee?
KM: At least from my experience with the Sonar tool is that it sometimes
complains about issues that are not really issues. I would like to. . .
In the case of Sonar there are ways of marking codes as codes that
should not be evaluated by Sonar, but that this is supported by and
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works with Sonar. What I would like to get from these tools is that
they actually point out things that needs to be taken care of. And I
actually think that Sonar actually does that, but it should not. . . It
should be able to. . . (? at 10:44) because of the way we write the
code and structure the code. We often use code constructs that code
that may trigger alert or be ﬂagged by the security tool, but if there
are ways of marking source code as code that should not be handled
by the tool then it’s ok.
BM: So you would prefer if the tool only checks for certain parts of the
code? That you can specify that.
KM: I will use the tool for all the code, but there are certain small parts
which we must be able to escape. Mostly in the way we declare things.
It is mainly more like not being bothered by. . . Because if you look
at the report of the tool, you get total sum of things it ﬁnds. But
it could be that most of those are minor things and it looks bad on
the report. So we kind of need a way of ﬁltering out things that they
are not very valuable or are not of importance and need to be in the
report.
BM: Do you think that the team has the skill to use the static analysis
tool? It probably has because it already uses it.
KM: Yes.
BM: And my last question was if you would prefer an integrated static
analysis tool or a report generated by a static analysis tool after build,
but I think you already answered that, that you would prefer to have
it in Jenkins.
KM: Yes, that’s correct. After the build.
BM: That was the list of my questions. (Skipped part of conversation,
maybe it should be included as it was relevant to the interview ques-
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tions as well) Thank you very much, thank you for your time.
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WHEN: 23 MAY 2016 at 09:00 AM
WHERE: Online
ATTENDEES: Developer 2, Bisera Milosheska
BM: What is your job title?
BN: I think it’s senior software engineer probably. I used to work in Telenor
before and after 5 years I found my title was consultant.
BM: Consultant :) for 5 years...
BN: I was not aware :) but I think it’s senior software engineer.
BM: How many years of programming experience you have?
BN: Well... about 20 years. I started meddling with it in mid-nineties.
BM: So during these 5 years you were consultant, you were actually an
engineer? :)
BN: Well I was a programmer I was considering myself a programmer.
That was my ﬁrst job at Telenor.
BM: Have you had any previous experience with security-oriented tools?
BN: Security oriented tools, such as... give an example?
BM: Such as. . . I’m investigating SonarQube and FindSecurityBugs at the
moment.
BN: In that case yes. I had experience with static analysis tools, I also
had experience with ﬁrewalls. So I guess the answer would be yes.
BM: How familiar with security vulnerabilities are you?
BN: Well moderately. . . the article I was reading just 10 minutes ago was
about just that.
BM: On a scale from 1 to 5, you would say 5?
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BN: No, I wouldn’t say 5. That takes a lot. And I’ve never been speciﬁcally
interested in security it’s more like something you really have to take
into consideration. So, I would say 3-4 for probably.
BM: But you do have a pretty high awareness of security?
BN: Yes, but it’s not my main interest.
BM: How safety-critical is the software you are developing?
BN: In this project it is not very safety critical.
BM: But you are working in the team?
BN: Yeah, but my part’s not very crit. . . well actually in this project
I’m mostly not working on software development, I am working on
infrastructure automation. So maybe 20% of my job or 30% is actual
programming and the rest is more architectural I guess.
BM: So it’s not too safety-critical?
BN: Actually that part is extremely safety critical but in a slightly diﬀerent
way. So it wouldn’t be safety critical like the case that would be
bothered by an SQL injection or things like that, instead you would
have to consider ﬁrewalls and access rights.
BM: Yes but it’s not to safety critical in terms of what I want to investi-
gate. . . in terms of the source code itself.
BN: So we should probably only consider the coding part.
BM: Yes. Do all of the developers I am interviewing work on separate
projects?
BN: No. I am working with Kjell and Thomas also, so I’m currently at
two projects and last week I was mostly working on this project which
is a development one, creating a message store and assembly facility
or modifying what we had and that has some security considerations.
BM: You are actually working on the same project but you have diﬀerent
roles.
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BN: Yes.
BM: How do you feel about bringing software security into operations?
Would you ﬁnd it distracting or helpful?
BN: Could you please elaborate a little bit on that?
BM: Like implementing a software security tool such as SonarQube or
FindSecurityBugs that would do a static source code analysis and
report on the vulnerabilities that it has found. That would happen
during the development process actually.
BN: That sounds wonderful.
BM: So wouldn’t you ﬁnd it distracting? Do you think that it is more
helpful than distracting?
BN: It’s absolutely more helpful. Developing software is perhaps more
an art than science. It’s not like when you are building a bridge,
you don’t have any formulas to guide you and there is a very real
possibility that your software will contain a lot of errors, as opposed
to the bridge which will not. So software engineering is not really
engineering in my view.
BM: So any alerts (triggered) during the process will be helpful?
BN: I think so, absolutely. I’m not sure everybody would feel that way
but I deﬁnitely like this. I have set up SonarQube and Cobertura and
other static analysis tools previously when working with Java and I
ﬁnd it useful. And I also ﬁnd continuous integration quite useful.
BM: Well I would like to hear your personal view, that’s why I have per-
sonal interviews with all of the developers. I’m really glad you think
that way.
BM: Which static analysis tools do you already use in this project?
BN: Bjørn Remseth set up SonarQube some time ago. Unfortunately, I
don’t think it is eﬀective as our build server is currently broken, so I
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think the answer would be that right now we don’t use any.
BM: Why don’t you think it’s eﬀective? Is it because no one is...?
BN: Because our build server is not building.
BM: No one is responsible for that tool maybe?
BN: It’s complicated. It’s part of a rather big thing, we want to have
better testing processes and we want to have proper smoke tests, or
acceptance tests, but doing that requires us to be able to automati-
cally deploy recent versions of the software and that is something we
attempted and failed, so we need to do that in a diﬀerent way. So
basically we need a way to have an environment where we can easily
deploy more or less automated things – artefacts [the package or ex-
ecutable resulting from a software build]. We have that now, so the
next step would be to actually do this automated deployment. We
also need to implement versioning of the software, so that we know
what version is actually running there. Unfortunately, everything is
currently versioned 1.0, everything! Which I ﬁnd a bit annoying to say
the least, so that’s something we need to ﬁx. And then we can start
having a build server, build automatically and deploy automatically
and at that point, as a side eﬀect of that we will get static analysis
tool. So I guess you could say that static analysis is not prioritised,
because we could probably just have it at the build server.
BM: Do you think that it will be hard to implement it for the needs of my
project?
BN: No, not at all. Actually it only hasn’t been prioritised, because the
main priority has been running the smoke tests. That we developed,
we have the smoke tests ready, just didn’t manage to get the environ-
ment done. It’s actually quite easy to simply set up the build server
to just build the project and ship it oﬀ to static analysis.
BM: Yes, the implementation itself is trivial, I think.
BN: Yes, I think most of the setup is there. It’s just never been, at least
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not mine, priority.
BM: Have you used SonarQube in terms of the project for discovering some
kind of vulnerabilities until now?
BN: I think there is no speciﬁc focus on security there. We had a few runs
of SonarQube on our projects and the quality there is not very good.
It reports huge amounts of issues.
BM: Of none important alerts?
BN: Some high, and some. . . most low I guess. I didn’t look too closely,
I just shook my head.
BM: Do you fear the impact of implementing additional security tools on
the workﬂow of your team?
BN: No.
BM: Do you think that maybe if you get this kind of huge reports and you
would have to act upon these reports, would you ﬁnd it distracting
maybe?
BN: No, I like learning (teaching?) [probably meant “learning about”,
but probably more in the sense that I like to have (lack of) quality
quantiﬁed] this kind of things. If that was my primary job, to just ﬁx
issues, I would enjoy it probably.
BM: So you are prepared to act upon the ﬁndings of the tool?
BN: I wouldn’t mind at all. I guess, maybe the issue is that sometimes is
not just a simple ﬁx, it’s like OK, thing is just a crock of s*** and
it needs to be rewritten and it’s a huge job. That’s sometimes that
maybe a problem. And also, it could be I guess conﬂict in views,
on how to solve issues. I think a lot of the things that SonarQube
reports are more like code formatting issues. I don’t know if you have
worked with programmers before, you probably know that if you start
arguing about how to format your source code and you could have a
three hour discussion, because not everybody agrees. I mean this is
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like someone likes the variable names like that. . .
BM: Yes, everyone has diﬀerent kind of practices.
BN: Yeah. So many of the things that SonarQube reports are more on the
aesthetic side and they always raise discussion, so you probably need
to have coding style guidelines, not everybody agrees with them or
you can do some of these ﬁxes. That’s not related to security. Secu-
rity things are more concrete and needs to deal with.
BM: What challenges do you foresee? You answered a part of this question.
BN: When cleaning up/handling the SonarQube reports?
BM: Yes, when the tool is already implemented and the reports are there,
do you think that. . . ?
BN: OK, so we have a little bit of experience, as I said. Bjørn Remseth set
it up half a year ago, I guess. And I had a look at it and I guess some
others had a look at it and the problem is that when you set it up at
this stage of the project we have a huge design debt, because I guess
things were implemented quickly, rushed before summer last year and
way to start. And of course in itself is not productive, nobody gives
you a hug after ﬁxing SonarQube reports, there’s no new features,
no performance improvements, in general. Maybe it’s not seen as
productive, in a sense.
BM: So you think that the programmers are not very aware of the improve-
ments that this tool might make on the long run?
BN: Personally I think, and I am very fond of this term design debt. You
create some piece of software, usually you have a deadline, you have to
cut some corners and you ship it and at that point you will have some
design debt and you will have to spend some hours every month just
to write oﬀ that design debt and there is usually more features and
most of them work when a software project comes after the initial
release. That’s almost always the case. And most of that work is
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writing oﬀ the design debt. So I think that such a tool can be very
good for managing the design debt and knowing where to work [what
to work on]. Of course, design debt is not something you see directly,
it is something that is only visible indirectly, because at some point,
adding features becomes very hard because you are up to your ears
design debt and it’s hard to. . . it’s inﬂexible, it’s fragile, so on. . .
But, back to your previous question, I think it is easier if you have
a new project to start using such a tool. Because initially you have
zero issues.
BN: Yes, but the idea is actually to implement it in an existing project.
BM: And then you have 2647 issues.
BN: Yes, but you can still adapt the tool, you can exclude some of the
warnings if you want, if you think that they are not important.
BM: Yes, you can look at the critical ones. I guess you could maybe say
that ’OK, Monday before lunch that’s only ﬁxing SonarQube issues.
You can do things like that I guess.
BN: Maybe you can reserve a part of your working time just for that, just
on security issues reported.
BM: Does the team have the skills to use the static analysis tool?
BN: I don’t think that would be a problem. It’s just like a gloriﬁed report,
at least SonarQube. But, there are other things. I’ve only brieﬂy
looked at SonarQube now, but a few years ago I worked on setting
up static analysis tools for Java and I recall that there was actually
quite a lot of conﬁguration, you need to customise the reports (? at
17:47). This kind of thing is OK, don’t warn me on this, this is how
we do it here. There is actually quite a lot of functionality in these
tools that they don’t necessarily have to deal with.
BM: Yes, deﬁnitely. We will focus only on a set of vulnerabilities, not ev-
erything that the tool is able to report. Because it will be too much
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and won’t do any quality research with all of what the tool can dis-
cover.
BM: I have one last question. Which would you prefer, an IDE integrated
static analysis tool or a report generated by a static analysis tool after
build? Would you prefer to have it as part of Jenkins?
BN: Yes, I understand. I think I have tried both and I don’t think they
are necessarily mutually exclusive, I think you can have both. But
I ﬁnd the one that comes after the build more useful because then
you can’t do very. . . First of all, it’s authoritative across all devel-
opers, it’s produced by a single tool, it’s always like a single report
and it contains the customisations of the team, not your personal cus-
tomisations. It is not interfering with your development process, it’s
a bit like autocorrect in word processors. Kind of like ’Oh, is that
mistyped? What was the correct spelling?’ and suddenly you go out
of the ﬂow. I don’t like to be interrupted. And you can also fail the
build if the static analysis tool has a critical warning or a major warn-
ing. On the other hand, I think integrated in your local development
environment it is nice sometimes, you can check for instance before
committing, it’s useful, but it’s not as important, it is very nice to
have. So the auto integration is mandatory, but local integration is
just nice to have.
BM: Thank you very much for your answers. That was it. (Skipped con-
versation, irrelevant to the interview questions)
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WHEN: 23 MAY 2016 at 10:30 AM
WHERE: Online
ATTENDEES: Developer 3, Bisera Milosheska
BM: What is your job title?
BK: Senior software engineer.
BM: How many years of programming experience do you have?
BK: 20.
BM: Have you had any previous experience with security oriented tools?
BK: I can’t think of speciﬁc tools... Not in static analysis sense or... I
guess, no... Not that I can think of. Maybe if you give some example,
perhaps...
BM: In this project we are currently investigating static analysis tools,
SonarQube and FindSecurityBugs are such examples.
BK: I haven’t used those, no.
BM: How familiar with security vulnerabilities are you? On a scale from 1
to 5, how would you estimate your... (familiarity)?
BK: On a scale of 1 to 5, 1 being not very?
BM: Yes.
BK: 2 or 3, maybe 3.
BM: How safety critical is the software you are developing?
BK: It’s not safety critical... it’s not very safety critical, 1 or 2...
BM: Which project are you working on at the moment? You are all working
in the same team and probably on the same project, but on diﬀerent
parts of it, right?
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BK: That’s true. But when you say safety critical that makes me think of
airplanes.
BM: Oh, well... I mean in terms of security vulnerabilities and how could
those aﬀect the end users. Do you use a lot of personal data maybe
that could be leaked?
BK: Ok, then in that case it is quite high because yes, we store their
conversations, their messages and their voice conversations. So, if
you mean with respect to data, then yes.
BM: I mean if a vulnerability could be exploited in any way, what kind of
eﬀect would that have?
BK: Potentially, it could have very negative eﬀect for us. If someone got
into our systems and then had access to our users both personal data
and private conversations. That would have a very bad eﬀect, both
for the users and us, yes.
BM: So you would say that you store very sensitive data?
BK: Yeah, we store sensitive personal data, private messages.
BM: How do you feel about bringing security software into operations?
BK: How do I feel?
BM: Would you ﬁnd it distracting or helpful?
BK: I would ﬁnd it helpful, deﬁnitely. We don’t have formal method or we
don’t have formal software tools yet to help in this. I think we rely
on the general background knowledge of the developers. I think we’ve
had a few presentations on the subject. Which have been helpful. We
have had a workshop with a security company and that was useful,
but that was more to get an awareness of typical vulnerabilities.
BM: But, would you ﬁnd it distracting if there was another tool that would
try to help developers with the discovering of some of the vulnerabil-
ities?
BK: I wouldn’t ﬁnd that distracting, no. I’d ﬁnd that useful.
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BM: But maybe it would report a lot of vulnerabilities that aren’t actually
vulnerabilities, maybe it will have a lot of false positives...
BK: If it had a lot of false positives, then yes, people would start ignoring
the tool. So, if the tool is tuned to work properly or can be conﬁg-
ured...
BM: Yes, it has to be properly and thoughtfully conﬁgured.
BM: Which static analysis tools do you already use? Do you use any?
BK: I think we use Sonar for some of the Java code. We have a lot of
JavaScript code, but I am not sure if we use Sonar for that. We
might have used it once, but we don’t use it regularly.
BM: Have you used it to ﬁnd any security speciﬁc weaknesses?
BK: We haven’t used it speciﬁcally for that. We use Facebook’s infrastruc-
ture for writing, the Javascript framework that we use for our Web
frontend has some support for warning you when you are vulnerable
to XSS attacks for instance.
BM: What kind of framework do you use?
BK: React, framework for writing web apps. They help you a little by
making it hard to create XSS scripting attacks in your code. You
have to explicitly say this bit of code is unsafe in order to introduce
that vulnerability as it were. But that’s the only explicit example I
can think of.
BM: Do you fear the impact of implementing additional security tools on
the workﬂow of your team?
BK: I fear that a little bit, yes. I think it would be reassuring if we ac-
tually got something that the developers thought it was worthwhile.
If developers are implementing something that they don’t think gives
the beneﬁt then it would be an issue, but if they can see that it is
helping then it shouldn’t be a problem.
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BM: Are you prepared to act upon the ﬁndings of the security tool?
BK: Yes, given what I just said. If I believe the ﬁnding and if I believe
that that is a vulnerability and it will help, then yes. I guess that
comes both to the tool and our understanding.
BM: What challenges do you foresee?
BK: In adopting the tool?
BM: Yes, in implementing it.
BK: We have several software languages that we write in. Predominantly
Java and Javascript. But also some C++ as well. So to target each
of those diﬀerent languages would be an issue. And... I guess the
volume of... We have quite a large set of software now. So it could
bring up many many changes I suppose, a lot of work to do... Because
the project has been running for two years.
BM: Is the code base too big to start with this kind of testing now?
BK: Yes, potentially the code base is too large and then it depends a bit
on the nature of the changes that are required.
BM: Does the team have the skills to use the static analysis tool?
BK: Hopefully yes, we have used static analysis tools, so it is not totally
unfamiliar. Maybe not with a security focus.
BM: Which one would you prefer? An IDE integrated static analysis tool
or a report generated by a static analysis tool after build?
BK: I would probably prefer the IDE, but I would actually like both. My
preference would be for the IDE.
BM: Which IDE do you use?
BK: I use a lot of SublimeText and plugins for SublimeText. And occa-
sionally... recently that’s the only one I’ve been using.
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BM: I think that in the case of your team (the context the tool will be
applied to), it will be more appropriate to use Jenkins integrated
reporting because you are all using diﬀerent IDEs.
BK: Yes, that’s true. We are using diﬀerent ones, so Jenkins would be a
good ﬁt.
BM: Up until now, you are the ﬁrst developer that said that would prefer
an IDE plugin.
BK: OK, I guess I was just imagining... As I said, both would be ideal,
but...
BM: Would you ﬁnd it very distracting if the build failed on Jenkins when
the tool alerts about some high security vulnerabilities?
BK: Potentially yes, I am familiar with the problem of too much noise
from these tools, because it’s diﬃcult to ﬁlter out what’s relevant
and what’s not, as I mentioned. So potentially yes, but I haven’t
seen a tool that achieves that yet. But you generally conﬁgure it
right, you switch oﬀ certain warnings in certain circumstances, be-
cause you know better than the tool. Yes, it might be distracting at
ﬁrst, but that’s why I mentioned it should be possible to conﬁgure
things, switch of the noise.
BM: Thank you very much. That was the set of questions, I am done with
it. (Skipped conversation, irrelevant to the interview questions)
BK: Thank you, I hope that was useful.
BM: Yes! Thank you for your time!
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WHEN: 24 MAY 2016 at 11:00 AM
WHERE: Online
ATTENDEES: Developer 4 (tech lead), Bisera Milosheska
BM: What is your job title?
BR: Senior software engineer.
BM: How many years of programming experience do you have?
BR: 37.
BM: Have you had any previous experience with security-oriented tools?
BR: Not particularly, no.
BM: How familiar with security vulnerabilities are you? Let’s say on a
scale from 1 to 5?
BR: 3. I mean I am aware of it, I just have never worked/focused on it.
BM: Yes, yes. But you are aware of what kind of security vulnerabilities
exist and what they mean.
BR: Yes I am.
BM: How safety-critical is the software you are developing?
BR: I would say it’s pretty signiﬁcant.
BM: If you were to estimate it the same way as the previous question, on
a scale from 1 to 5, what number would you choose?
BR: 3-4. It’s probably not going to be people’s life depending on it on a
regular bases. But it could actually be. So it’s not in the same class
as as say nuclear weapons or in general weapons technology or life-
support technology or things of that nature. But it is communication
services and we do have somewhat sensitive and in some cases even
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highly sensitive information. So releasing it could be quite danger-
ous. So I would say that it’s pretty important, but it’s not the most
important thing in the world. But I mean that quite literally, I mean
nuclear weapons would probably be the most important thing and. . .
BM: Yes, I was expecting that kind of answer, because all of the develop-
ers almost said the same. That you are working with pretty sensitive
data, with personal data and that that’s the reason why you would
indicate that it is pretty much safety critical.
BM: How do you feel about bringing software security into operations?
BR: I am not sure I understand the question.
BM: If a tool would be implemented as is the intention now with our
project, would you ﬁnd it distracting or helpful?
BR: That of course depends on how the tool goes into the workﬂow. In
general, we do use automatic tools for many things. One of the things
that they are in general very good at is just picking out known and
easily formulate-able issues that we need to ﬁx, so type errors, stylistic
errors in the code, when integration fails and things of that nature.
Things that we. . . that is known to us and that we do want to have
support in the software. And something diﬃcult issues every now and
then, run this tests and we do it all the time. If you can get it on
that level then it will be pretty nice. Because it will make us more
aware of the practices and enforce it in consistent manner and this is
kind of workﬂow that developers are usually quite used to and com-
fortable with. If on the other hand the tools require also interaction
or doing things that are not very productive and actually not really
contributing to security , because it is just window dressing, then it
wouldn’t be very attractive. (technical diﬃculties)
BM: Which static analysis tools do you already use?
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BR: We use something called Sonar, which has multiple tools in it. It is
common to run test-coverage measurement. I actually don’t remem-
ber the name of the component tools. It’s good for ﬁnding complex-
ity in software, like referential loops and things of that nature. Bad
style, non-conformance to coding standard, processing methods that
are large or complex.
BM: Do you use it regularly?
BR: We use some of it regularly. It’s not well integrated in the workﬂow.
We do have a tool that allows us to look at the code that’s written,
we also have tools that makes it possible for us to do this on our work
stations. Sometimes we use it, sometimes we don’t. I tend to enable
as much of this as I can in my IDE, so that I get warnings as I write
code. And for the most part that is stuﬀ that is very useful, because
then I just ﬁx things as I write them t ﬁxed, when I commit the code.
(Very noisy, diﬃcult to transcribe) It’s not very systematic, or I guess,
if it’s quite easily available.
BM: Have you used any static analysis tools to ﬁnd speciﬁc security de-
fects/weaknesses?
BR: No.
BM: Do you fear the impact of implementing additional security tools on
the workﬂow of your team?
BR: I actually don’t know how to answer that. Because if the tools are
non-obtrusive in itself then I don’t fear it at all. What I fear is if
they make it necessary to engage mentally a lot in the tool, as to
the messages it uses then I would be reluctant to use it. Getting
feedback about ’This is a bad practice, this is a bad practice’ and do
that continually, that would be almost exclusively good.
BM: Are you prepared to act upon the ﬁndings of the security tool?
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BR: That actually depends on the ﬁndings. So, for the most part the an-
swer would be yes. And then for most of these tools there is a point
above of diminishing returns. So for instance, let me take an anal-
ogy. Test-coverage - we tend to like high test coverage. But there
are always cases that a test coverage is counted as number of lines
covered by at least one test. Which basically means that if you test
for the most common happy “day scenarios”, your code will probably
not break, most will be ﬁne, which is good. But even if you test all
your code, all the happy day scenarios, you’ll probably not get more
than like 80 or 70 percent test-coverage. There is some code that is
initialization code that is not run in testing, or more commonly you
have error situations and handling of error-situations that may be
quite rare and writing code for every one of those is just too boring.
So it doesn’t happen. And that’s one thing. Another thing is that you
have all kinds of input parameters and permutation there of that you
actually don’t test for and don’t measure coverage of either. Because
that would be complex parameter settings and the space of complex
parameter settings for the things we do is actually quite big. And
even starting to dig into that somewhat is in itself very complex, so
we don’t do it. And if we found that it was something that was worth-
while because we did a lot of that and we’ve got some particularly
interesting situation then we would do that. But usually we just say
’Ok, now it’s enough. We have 50-70% coverage, it looks good.’. (?
at 12:32) is mostly secure (? at 12:35), we won’t. So it would be the
same kind of logic I would suppose that we would use on a something
more directed to security testing. If I am really really really obscure
and the impact is not that high then it probably would be ignored.
But we would have to see how the tool actually works to make. . . to
form an opinion on that. It is hard to say something without actually
having looked at the tools and I haven’t looked at any of the tools yet.
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BM: What challenges do you foresee?
BR: Challenges? First of all, just practical challenges. Making the things
actually work, that usually is the worst thing. The hassle-factor is
not to be underestimated. So if it actually works, it works in the
IDE or it works in the build server, we will get regular reports, then
I will come to my no. 2 fear, which is that we end up in a situ-
ation similar to what we have now with Sonar. Which is OK but
we just don’t use it very much. Which means that good suggestions
that we should have taken into account while just actually writing the
code is not taken into account. That would be my second largest fear.
BM: Does the team have the skill to use the static analysis tool?
BR: Yeah, the developers in the team have the skills.
BM: Which would you prefer, an IDE integrated static analysis tool or a
report generated by a static analysis tool after build?
BR: I vote for both. If I could choose, I would choose the former (IDE),
because that gives more immediate feedback. But Sonar has very
nice feature and that is that we can see development of metrics for
the whole team, which is much more diﬃcult if you have it just in the
IDE. So I would actually prefer to have both.
BM: Both combined or you would equally vote for both?
BR: When you sit and and work on something you work on a branch and
a code repository and that branch is unique, no one else has the same
as you, because you are the one developing on it. Which means that
if you can get feedback on what you are doing, while you are doing
it, that means that whatever hints, whatever advice the tool can give
you, you can take into account while you are in “the ﬂow”. So you
have developed the mental model of the system you are working on,
have it all in working set memory and you get the suggestion and then
you testify it. Which is very good way to work. It’s much better way
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to work then ﬁrst get to the build server, have a unique branch at the
build server, perhaps even a rather lengthy run because we have many
components and it doesn’t make sense to check them all at the same
time. That means that the feedback is not as immediate, you are
not in the ﬂow, you need to sit down, with a list the issues and that
is much more cumbersome to do.Still, it does have value. Because
again, maybe your IDE doesn’t support it, maybe someone else can
be making stuﬀ and the two of you who are making stuﬀ write on top
of each other and you didn’t see what happened when you did the
merge, but the stuﬀ actually compiled, got merged and there was an
issue. So they don’t solve exactly the same kind of problem, right?
That’s why it would be nice to have both, because some things are
quite easy to do in one way or the other, but again, if I had to choose
I would choose really good IDE support.
BM: But you all use diﬀerent IDEs, so it will probably be a little bit more
complicated to implement it on that level?
BR: Yes, I don’t see that changing either. Not anytime soon.
BM: Which agile methodology does the team use?
BR: If I were to say a word, I would say rainbow. Does that makes sense
for you?
BM: I know Scrum, Kanban...
BR: We use a combination of Scrum and Kanban, I would say. And it de-
pends what kind of mode we are in. Right now, I think we are moving
towards more traditional Scrum-like development where we have a set
of tasks and scope, then it’s nice to make some estimates. How long
it should take. . . Then we have the team do it in a sprint. The period
prior to that, we were much more in Kanban mode, where we had a
bunch of tasks and we just do them and we coordinate between us on
those tasks. BWe have some ﬁelds that are more or less functionally
separate, such as business support system integration and hosting and
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setup and infrastructure. They are actually mostly separate and we
have separate groups of people working on them. Which means that
we have now small groups and then we do coordination every two
weeks, make sure that we go in (? at 20:16) the same direction. It
could be Kanban to, but it tends to make you daily meetings to be
long, because you need to do a lot of coordination, which is not the
purpose of those meetings.
BM: How often do you release versions of the product?
BR: Honest answer: I don’t know. The infrastructure is mostly all done
now, it’s been a long time since we’ve released a new version.
BM: What was the last time you did a release?
BR: I would say some time last year. There has been so much infrastruc-
ture work. That is changing out, we will roll out in Sweden. So if you
ask this question again in a month or two, I will probably give you
an answer which is weeks or something like that. But at the moment
we haven’t done it for a long time.
BM: OK, so recently you’ve been focused on the infrastructural setup, but
in the future you are expecting to release software more often than
you do now.
BR: Yes, the whole purpose of doing the infrastructure the way we have
done it is exactly to do that. So that we can have a development
process with much more frequent releases.
BM: How do you measure developers’ eﬃciency, if you do?
BR: We don’t have metrics. So if people feel productive than they are
probablyare . We don’t actually measure it.
BM: Because sometimes these agile methodologies, these approaches, de-
ﬁne also developers’ eﬃciency and ways how to measure it and some
teams that are implementing these methodologies use also these tech-
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niques, so that’s why I wanted to. . .
BR: We don’t do that. In Telenor Digital we have had very varied expe-
rience with that kind of thing. We started. . . it’s been very diﬃcult
to measure. Because we used to do estimation on stories and then we
tried to dial in the estimation and after a while that sort of worked.
And then we tried to measure focus factors and things like that, to
see how eﬃcient people were with respect to the estimates they made.
But it turns out to be extremely diﬃcult. Because how focused are
you, on a scale from 1 to 9? And if you start factoring in, you’re fo-
cused or need to focus on a few estimates, that makes your estimates
more precise. But it doesn’t mean the deviations from estimates is in
kind of indicator of your activity. So, the answer is ’I don’t know’.
BM: My next question would have been how do you estimate the team’s
velocity per iteration, but you probably don’t do that as well.
BR: No, we don’t. Basically the same as answer for estimates estimate. I
just answered. So I think the best measure for that would actually
be something like releases per week or month or something like that.
BM: Not only as an estimate of a developer, but as an estimate of the
whole team’s work?
BR: Measuring individual developers to my mind does not make sense.
That’s my opinion. I don’t know how to measure it.
BM: Could you provide data or some project burndown charts? But you
probably don’t have that either. . .
BR: No, we don’t.
BM: Because at the end of the project I would like to compare somehow
how the implementation of the tool had an eﬀect on the team’s work,
how it aﬀected their eﬃciency.
BR: Yeah, I think you would need to ask basically. We don’t have any
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kind of objective measurements on that and again I don’t know how
to make those measurements.
BM: But you do have iterations, right? Sprints maybe, in terms of Scrum?
BR: Yeah, it looks like that. So for the last two. . . last month we had two
week sprints. Looks like we’re going to do that.
BM: Two week sprints? That’s the usual time length of one sprint?
BR: Yeah, that’s been usual for the last four weeks. Looks like it’s going
to be like that for some time now.
BM: What sequential processes are contained in or describe each iteration?
Do you have any speciﬁc set of sequential processes like development,
testing, review, code reviews after development? Do you have any
speciﬁc tasks that go. . . ?
BR: The sprint itself is. . . ﬁrst we do some kind of scoping, we look
at relevant tasks and also see if they are feasible at this time. Do
we have the necessary ingredients and if we don’t then we don’t do
them, but if we do we do them. And then we just work on the tasks.
And the tasks are complete when they are either testable, in the test
environment or they are actually implemented and in production. So
code is committed to the main branch of the repository after code
review and basically two people need to agree that the code is ﬁt for
being merged and then it’s merged. That is a continuous process, it’s
not something we do in a particular phase. Also we have continuous
discussion on the code as such.
BM: And do you have any validation practices maybe after. . . ?
BR: What do you mean by validation?
BM: Validation. . . like is a task validated after it is supposed to be ﬁnished,
after its status has changed from ’in progress’ to ’done’. Does it go
immediately to ’done’? Does it go in ’testing’ and then to ’done’?
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BR: Please repeat the question.
BM: At the beginning of each iteration probably you deﬁne some tasks.
You set some scope, you deﬁne tasks, problems and you start devel-
oping them. You have two weeks to complete some set of the tasks
and then my questions is: ’How does the status of these tasks change
throughout the iteration?’. When developers think they have com-
pleted their task, do they change the status just to ’completed’? Or
do you have any ’validation’ maybe in between?
BR: No, we don’t have any validation. The tasks are. . . We do testing
in many stages. First is of course unit testing, or ﬁrst is that we
just talk through the design. Then we do unit testing. We try to
keep coverage pretty good as I said. Which means that when we
put stuﬀ into production environment we have acceptance tests that
are usually a few happy day scenarios, e.g. testing provisioning of a
simulated user. And if that goes through then we say: ’OK, now it’s
done’. We don’t try to fuzz it (fuzz testing), we don’t aggressively look
for mistakes. We are basically optimistic. Which is not necessarily a
good thing but that is what we are.
BM: Yes, I understand. But you do some testing as well.
BR: Yes, we do. We have multiple phases of testing. We have a rule that
is not strictly enforced, but we do have a rule that things that go into
production should be acceptance tested. Which means that we run a
test on a simulated production environment with the happy day sce-
narios and it should actually automatically verify that the behavior
is correct.
BM: Yes. Does the team have any speciﬁc documented coding practices?
BR: Yes, we do. In practice, we only have for Java. That is the main
language we use. Not the only one, but it is the main language. And
then we basically use the common standard practices for Java and
then there are some additional documents for Telenor Digital that
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we look to. We don’t enforce those very strictly because they are
actually very strict and very detailed. But we do look to them and
we. . . I would say we use most of them. And they are also easily
checked automatically, which is one of the reasons that we tend to
follow them.
BM: They are checked automatically?
BR: Yes, many IDEs check conformance to this standards automatically.
BM: Do you practice pair programming? You do code reviews as I under-
stood.
BR: Only very occasionally, usually we don’t do pair programming. It
does happen, but it’s not common.
BM: But you do code reviews?
BR: Yes, we do.
BM: Do you practice refactoring of the code?
BR: All the time.
BM: Which OS platform do you use?
BR: OS X, Windows, Linux.
BM: Which IDE do you use?
BR: IntelliJ, NetBeans, Emacs. I think there is an eclipse user, I am not
really sure. There is something called Sublime.
BM: Which programming language do you use? Mostly Java, but. . .
BR: Mostly Java than JavaScript, fair amount of shell script,some Python.
I think that covers most of it.
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BM: Which continuous integration tool do you use?
BR: Jenkins.
BM: Do you have a separate testing, staging and production environment?
BR: We will really soon. That’s part of the goal. That’s very important
goal for the infrastructure project.
BM: But you don’t have separate environments for now?
BR: We might actually have that. Either we have it or. . . Let me take
that back. We do have it, but I don’t know if anyone are actually
using them. But that should happen this week or next week or some-
thing.
BM: How do you measure the quality of the software?
BR: Basically we don’t. We look at what Sonar tells us, it gives some
kind of metrics, some conformance standards, some not many stupid
things. But that’s the only thing we do, that’s only advisory and
we’re not following it religiously.
BM: So you don’t have any quality assurance practices I guess.
BR: Nothing that I haven’t described.
BM: Which testing tools do you already use, apart from the static analysis
tools?
BR: We base everything on JUnit, which is originally made as a unit test
framework. But it’s just something that runs Java code, so it has
been adopted for doing other things too. So we use it both for unit
testing, but also for acceptance testing. So in that acceptance test-
ing mode it runs tests towards a fully operational cluster and it runs
actual interactions as seen from the clusters point of view and it re-
ports them back as JUnit test results, so that we can look upon them
using tools for for that kind of thing. And it can also run it automati-
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cally, so that an automatic build breaks when an acceptance test fails.
BM: Which security testing tools do you already use, if you use any?
BR: None.
BM: At which point in the SDLC do you check for security vulnerabilities?
BR: I would say all of them except that we don’t have a separate review for
it. We look for it during design, try to avoid them, that is of course
the most important part. Then we just try to avoid bad practices
while coding, but we don’t explicitly look for security ﬂaws. We just
don’t do obviously stupid stuﬀ. It’s not any kind of formal process.
BM: And how do you usually test you software for security vulnerabilities?
Do you do that at least once a year, maybe?
BR: Actually no. We probably should, but we haven’t.
BM: I was thinking more of external testing maybe?
BR: We haven’t done anything like that. There is room for improvements.
BM: Yes, deﬁnitely. If there wasn’t, what would’ve been my job here. I
wouldn’t have a project.
BR: Are there any speciﬁc security vulnerabilities you would like to ad-
dress?
BM: Well SS7 is of course a bit old and pretty bad, we should probably be
systematic when it comes to automatically look for obvious exploits
when it comes to our build interfaces and we don’t. We haven’t made
a really good set of barriers for getting against insiders. That is
improving now, with the new setup. But it’s not really very good
there either. Also we should do test disaster recovery, because we
haven’t done that. And there are some design issues that are pretty
bad too. When it comes to securing secrets and sensitive logs. There
we know we have vulnerabilities by design because we haven’t made
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much eﬀort to avoid them. And that is something that could improve
things a lot. It would be really naive to assume that we will not have
breaches, so damage control and damage reduction would probably
be good things to design in and at the moment we haven’t.
BM: Most of the security vulnerabilities you just mentioned are not directly
related to the coding practices.
BR: True.
BM: Do you think that you have in mind some kind of security vulnerabil-
ities that might be caused by coding practices that you would like to
address?
BR: What I would probably like to do is to have a set of secure attacks per-
formed against our system on a regular basis. Preferably every day,
preferably automatically. If we get the funding we will do so. Because
unless we have pressure for change it’s probably gonna be diﬃcult to
change eﬃciently and at the moment we really don’t have that. We
have this assumption that everything is going ﬁne, but that’s really
not something that is inducive to the will to to change a lot.
BM: I have one more question. Regarding the adoption of static analysis
tool, in you opinion, what are the important factors necessary for
adoption of a static analysis tool for your team?
BR: Yes, I think I answered that previously. Getting it working, so we
can actually get this ﬁt for the beneﬁt it gives us on short term. And
the hustle factor. That’s the most important thing. If it doesn’t give
some beneﬁt on short term and it has no hustle then we just won’t
use it, simple as that. And then if it gives some beneﬁt, then we can
start on increasing that beneﬁt. That would be my approach to this.
Some small beneﬁt both in time and then develop on that.
BM: That would be the key factor.
BR: Yes.
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BM: Thank you very much, that was all from my part.
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WHEN: 26 MAY 2016 at 09:00 AM
WHERE: Online
ATTENDEES: Developer 5, Bisera Milosheska
BM: What is your job title?
HR: I think it’s senior developer or senior software engineer.
BM: How many years of programming experience do you have?
HR: I guess I was... 18 or 20. I’ve been doing development since 1998, so
18.
BM: Have you had any previous experience with security-oriented tools?
HR: Not really, we hadn’t. Of course at the university where we studied
security protocols, so we worked with this logic of designing security
protocols. I think it was BAN (Burrows-Abadi-Needham) logic, it
was called. Burrows and... there were three guys that had developed
a logic for reasoning about security protocols. I think they used it to
prove some errors in the Keberos authentication protocol. From that
I have not really used much tools.
BM: How familiar with security vulnerabilities are you? Let’s say on a
scale from 1 to 5.
HR: Well I get knowledge about the major ones that are released in the
news media and publications, but other vulnerabilities I probably
don’t know that much about.
BM: So how would you estimate your knowledge?
HR: I guess it would be in the middle of the scale, I have some knowledge
but it’s not a topic that I pay that much attention to. I notice the
major ones, but...
BM: Maybe 3 or 4?
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HR: Yeah, 3 I guess.
BM: How safety-critical is the software you are developing?
HR: Well it’s not really that safety-critical. I mean we’re developing phone
applications or phone service but the kind of critical part that you are
able to call emergency numbers is handled by the network operator,
like Telenor Norway or the one that has the radio network and these
things... So you can still do that over those system if our fails, so in
that sense is not critical. But of course it would be very irritating
for our users if it failed. And of course, people trust phone system
and messaging system and so on and they expect that we keep their
privacy and their information. But that part is most critical.
BM: Yes, regarding the sensitivity of data you are storing.
HR: Yeah.
BM: How do you feel about bringing software security into operations?
HR: Well of course, you want to have a system as secure as possible, but
on the other side there is often a cost making it secure. And when
you are on a time budget you cannot postpone the security...
BM: Would you ﬁnd it distracting more than helpful?
HR: It depends. It’s kind of... It has to be part of the goal of the system
you are building to be secure otherwise it’s distracting because if you
are just looking for functionality and spend a lot of time on making
your system secure or safe and doing things that you are not getting
paid for or the customers are not willing to pay for. And also it’s a lot
easier to build system when you don’t, for instance, use encryption on
your communication, then it’s easy to debug by just tapping into the
wire and see what data ﬂows there, but if it is encrypted everything
and ﬂows much harder to debug the application during development,
so in that sense developing with security in mind is harder.
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BM: Which static analysis tools do you already use?
HR: We use Sonar and diﬀerent plugins for that. We get removed some of
the classical bugs from the application.
BM: Mostly regarding the coding style?
HR: Yeah, coding style and how we use it. And also when we used to
program in C, we used this additional tool like Lint which tries to
ﬁnd memory leaks and discover other things in C program.
BM: Do you use it regularly or just when needed?
HR: I try to use it on a quite regular basis, not daily but from time to
time you go to my code and you got the warnings and consider if
those should be removed or not really.
BM: Have you used the static analysis tools, Sonar in this case, to ﬁnd any
speciﬁc security issues?
HR: No, not really. More general issues.
BM: Do you fear the impact of implementing additional security tools on
the workﬂow of your team?
HR: Some of the errors you probably remove with these tools might be
potential bugs anyway, that you would have to deal with anyway, so
I mean might be that you actually can at the same time be using
better tools for ﬁnding problems in your system. It depends a lot on
the tool and how easy it is to use and how it ﬂows into your regular
workﬂow.
BM: Are you prepared to act upon the ﬁndings of the security tool?
HR: Yeah, I mean it kind of depends on how critical the bugs are or the
problem reported are... so hard, most of the report is actually rele-
vant but sometimes it reports things that you know you made them
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for a reason.
BM: What challenges do you foresee in implementing this kind of tool?
HR: I didn’t quite understand that question.
BM: The idea of the project is to implement a static analysis tool, that
will discover security vulnerabilities.
HR: I mean it probably should be discussed in in addition too of course,
but developers can use it on their workstations or when they are do-
ing their coding it probably also should be used as part of the build
pipeline, so that your changes don’t go into the production system.
Having been run through a pipeline which also includes these security
analysers.
BM: Would you prefer to have it as part of the build server or as an IDE
integrated static analysis tool?
HR: I think both, you want to have it on the build server, but the reports
you want to fetch like you can from Sonar, you can fetch the Sonar
reports into the IDE where you’re working so you can see them there
and strictly jump to the code part that’s mentioned. Otherwise it gets
kind of a bit troublesome if you have to look at from that page or from
text ﬁles and then navigate to your code so if automatic navigation to
the problem’s part is supported by the tool then that would be good.
But of course, you need to also have it in a kind of batch mode or be
able to run it on a server as part of your build process.
BM: Do you think it will be more eﬀective if we implement it in both ways?
HR: Yes, I think so. Otherwise if you will just have it batch tool, that
is kind of . . . You have this big bang test of security and then you
get a lot of reports, while if you have it as part of your tool you get
continuously the warnings and can improve on that while you are at
that part of the code.
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BM: Does the team have the skill to use a static analysis tool?
HR: Yeah, I think so. If you have it there and the tool is reasonably easy to
use, it will start the tool point it to the code and the tool will report
in a way that people understand. I guess it also is a learning process,
you have to learn what the reports really mean. But once you get
used to that, you easily see that ’Oh, this is that kind of report! Ok,
then I need to change this.’.
BM: Yes, it is deﬁnitely a learning process. And I agree that much atten-
tion has to be dedicated to the way how the tool is implemented. It
has to be properly conﬁgured so that it doesn’t report a lot of false
positives.
HR: Yes, right.
BM: That was all from my part. (Skipped conversation part, irrelevant for
the interview questions) Thank you very much for the interview and
your time.
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Appendix B
Independent evaluation phase:
CWE mappings
Commercial tool
The following is just an example of the structure of a CWE mapping ﬁle.
The rest of the CWE mapping ﬁles are availble in the Github repository [30].
<mappings scanner="Commercial tool">
<scannerCode desc="Access Control: Amazon Web Services"
name="Access Control: Amazon Web Services">
<cwe id="566" />
</scannerCode>
<scannerCode desc="Access Control: Android Provider"
name="Access Control: Android Provider">
<cwe id="566" />
</scannerCode>
<scannerCode desc="Access Control: Anonymous LDAP Bind"
name="Access Control: Anonymous LDAP Bind">
<cwe id="285" />
</scannerCode>
<scannerCode desc="Access Control: Database" name="Access
Control: Database">
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<cwe id="566" />
</scannerCode>
<scannerCode desc="Access Control: LDAP" name="Access Control:
LDAP">
<cwe id="639" />
</scannerCode>
<scannerCode desc="Access Control: Weak Security Constraint"
name="Access Control: Weak Security Constraint">
<cwe id="285" />
</scannerCode>
..................................................................
<scannerCode desc="" name="Unsafe JNI">
<cwe id="111" />
</scannerCode>
<scannerCode desc="" name="Unsafe Reflection">
<cwe id="470" />
</scannerCode>
<scannerCode desc="" name="XPath Injection">
<cwe id="643" />
</scannerCode>
</mappings>
Appendix C
Post-implementation
evaluation:
Questionnaire
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